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Chapter 1
Understanding Ethnicity
Images of Ethnicity
God has not created all these ethnicities. God created a single person.
People created ethnicity later.
— 1992 Christmas pastoral address, Biguku parish, Uganda
Ethnicity in Africa, for some, evokes searing images of genocidal violence, illus-
trated by the tragic communal conflagrations that have marked recent Rwandan and
Burundian history, especially the 1994 Rwanda genocide and its aftermath so heavily
covered in the media. In these images, ethnic conflict is a product of “ancient tribal
hatreds,” and is thus an inescapable part of the natural order. A radically different per-
spective prevailed among African nationalists at the moment of independence; ethnicity,
a form of backwardness to be erased by nation-building and rapid development, was
destined for the dustbins of history. “In three or four years,” declared radical nationalist
leader Sekou Toure of Guinea at the moment of independence, “no one will remember
the tribal, ethnic, or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage
to our country and its population” (Toure 1959: 28). At most, ethnicity was a politically
illegitimate basis of public expression, which needed to be confined to the private realm.
Yet another image dominated the colonial mind; Africa, for the European occupant, was
quintessential^ “tribal.” Thus the task of the colonial state was to discover, codify, and
map an ethnic geography for their newly conquered domains, according to the premise
that the continent was inhabited by “tribal man.” This ethnic template, as imagined by the
colonizer, became the basis for administrative organization.
None of these images captures the essence of the ethnic phenomenon in Africa, or
for that matter anywhere else. All of them are rooted in a primordialist premise, the
notion that cultural identity is a timeless essence whose origins are outside history. Thus
the 1994 Rwandan genocide (and comparable events in Bosnia and Kosovo) could be
represented as merely one more episode in a historically determined infernal cycle, rather
than an entirely modem tragedy. Or the Guinean leader Toure could perceive ethnicity as
a badge of primeval backwardness that would be swept away by the revolutionary trans-
formation his political vision promised. Or the colonial official could imagine that their
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tribal cartography was naturalizing a historically formed African order, which could serve
as the organizing vessel for the “civilizing mission” they proposed to undertake.
Today these visions all seem remarkably archaic. The “ancient tribal hatreds”
thesis never had credibility among specialists, however current in some popular accounts,
and has largely disappeared from serious media reporting. The phrase was most fre-
quently encountered as an all-purpose explanation in Rwanda and Burundi during the
1990s. Although the ethnic labels that served as violent lines of cleavage in these nations
have precolonial origins, they became comprehensive and rigidly ranked categories only
in the colonial period; they were heavily influenced by imperial codifications and further
transformed by politicized actions in the last half-century. Those commentators who took
refuge in theories of primeval animosities were in part thrown off the scent by the fact
that some of the protagonists themselves are prone to historicize 1 the conflict, and to
project it backward to time immemorial. Yet the fact remains that prior to colonial occu-
pation, although warfare was frequent in the region, Hutu and Tutsi never fought each
other as ethnic communities (see Newbury 2001)—nor for that matter did Serbs and
Croats prior to World War n.
The illusion articulated by Sekou Toure and a number of his contemporaries that
ethnicity belonged on a lower rung of a normative hierarchy of identities, destined for
erasure by nationalism or at least relegation to residual forms of consciousness by the
historical march toward progress, has also vanished. In this view, the higher civilizational
forms of human solidarity, expressed in terms of nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and anti-
imperialism, would be affirmed by the mass mobilization of the liberation struggle and by
subsequent national integration. In part, this hopeful belief in the nation ascendant fed
upon a linear mode of thought dominant in the world at large at the high water mark of
the African conquest of independence in 1960; history was understood as a triumphant
march from traditional divisions to modem national integration. The United States still
held assimilationist “melting pot” notions as national dogma, and most observers took at
face value Soviet assertions that the Lenin-Stalin nationality policy within the framework
of state socialism had “solved the national question.” In Western Europe, claims of
national minorities were perceived as the harmless chatter of local antiquarians, eccen-
trics, and clerical reactionaries (Young 1986: 440). The discourse of multiculturalism had
yet to appear. Thus the anointed role of the newly independent states as nation-builders
1 This very useful term here refers to attempts to give the appearance of historical reality to events
or processes for which there is little evidence of their existence in earlier times.
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appeared as a necessary and inevitable world historical venture. But such certitudes
dissolved over the next couple of decades, replaced by an acknowledgment of ethnicity as
an enduring attribute of African political dynamics. The late Nigerian scholar, Claude
Ake, spoke for the contemporary intellectual era in his insistence that an authentic Afri-
can democracy “will have to recognize nationalities, subnationalities, ethnic groups and
communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realization and will have
to grant them rights to cultural expression and political and economic participation” (Ake
1996: 132).
The third obsolete image of ethnicity in Africa, the illusion that colonial ethnic
mappings were historically authentic, is likewise less frequently spotted at the turn of the
century. The disposition of colonial and other states to impose a rationalized, systema-
tized, and radically simplified representation of the social order in pursuit of their projects
of high modernity is part and parcel of the exercise of hegemony. James Scott persua-
sively argues the case for this disposition in Seeing Like a State (Scott 1998). In the early
and middle colonial years, this practice of official cultural codification found expression
in a wave of often influential ethnic monographs, authored by missionaries and adminis-
trators as well as anthropologists, each one a standardized distillation of colonial knowl-
edge about a particular named community, whose transhistorical existence and bounded
differentiation was the (often inarticulate) major premise. What a leading anthropologist,
Aidan Southall (himself the author of a widely cited ethnic monograph) later came to
term the “illusion of tribe” (Southall 1956, 1970) first assumed importance when analysts
began to note in the 1950s that identity categories in the newly swelling urban centers
were strikingly different from the earlier colonial mappings. Subsequently, Leroy Vail
and his collaborators, Terence Ranger, and many others have laid bare the extent to
which ethnic maps were not merely a simplification but also a creation of classification
schemes of external origin (see Vail 1989, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). By the 1980s, a
new school of theorizing about ethnicity began to take form, which stressed the social
construction of identity, a theme to which we will return.
Indeed, the very vocabulary of analysis is relatively new. Nathan Glazer and
Daniel Moynihan discovered that the first instance of the term “ethnicity” recorded by the
compilers of the massive Oxford English Dictionary was only in 1953 (Glazer and
Moynihan 1975: 1). In Africa until the 1960s, the term used to connote cultural identity
was invariably “tribe” or “tribalism.” Inherent in this label was an association of ethnic
consciousness with backward or primitive behaviors and values, sparking its denial by
the independence generation of nationalist intellectuals. The gradual lexical displacement
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of “tribalism” by “ethnicity,” which firmly situated African forms of cultural conscious-
ness within universal patterns of greater sub-national self-assertion, was a semiotic event
of major importance. The very vocabulary used to describe a social phenomenon had
significant consequences.
Defining Ethnicity
In this monograph, I will begin with a discussion of various definitions of ethnic-
ity. A conceptual grasp of this subject requires that we recognize the complexity of
contemporary patterns of cultural consciousness: the layering of identities, the blurring of
boundaries, the situational and sometimes fluid nature of identity, and the ambiguities
arising from the tension between the group basis of visible ethnic action and the individ-
ual level at which collective identity is experienced and performed. I then turn to the
relationship between ethnicity and other relevant types of social identity: religion, race,
nationalism, gender, and class. Consideration of the three major approaches to the analy-
sis of cultural pluralism that have become visible in the last couple of
decades
—
primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism—offers a useful frame-
work for summarizing the major debates within the field. Three contrasting case studies
of ethnicity and politics will help illustrate how the ethnic factor operates in specific
settings, and will also demonstrate the striking range of variation in the saliency of
ethnicity and its modes of political expression. The examples chosen are Tanzania,
Uganda, and Congo-Kinshasa. Finally, the study closes with comparative observations on
the role of ethnicity in political process and conflict, comparisons of Africa with other
regions on this dimension, and consideration of formulas for the accommodation of
cultural diversity.
Definitions of ethnicity vary, but they converge around a central core of key
elements. A 1964 definition suggests that ethnicity pertains to “a social group which,
within a larger cultural and social system, claims or is accorded special status in terms of
a complex of traits (ethnic traits) which it exhibits or is believed to exhibit.”2 Glazer and
Moynihan detach the term from the implication of minority standing by preferring the
simple formulation as “any group of distinct cultural tradition and origin.” Max Weber, in
an early definition of ethnic group (a term long predating “ethnicity”) insists on “a sub-
jective belief’ in “common descent ... whether or not an objective blood relation exists”
2 Melvin Tumin, in the 1964 Dictionary of the Social Science, cited in Glazer and Moynihan 1975:
4 .
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(Weber 1968: 389). Donald Horowitz stresses real or imagined shared ancestry, the
centrality of kinship metaphors, a minimum size, and a sense of distinctiveness, whether
or not this distinctiveness rests on unique cultural attributes (Horowitz 1985: 53). Harold
Isaacs insists upon the nature of the consciousness arising from group identity, its ineffa-
ble significance to its members, and the deep sense of belonging that it inspires (Isaacs
1975). In a seminal contribution, Fredrik Barth refocused the debate by insisting that the
critical element is “the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it
encloses” (Barth 1969: 15). The cultural content of an ethnic collectivity often evolves or
even mutates over time, but the sense of shared identity remains, shaped importantly by
the sense of difference from human communities that lie beyond the boundary.
I would extract three core elements to ethnicity from the available menu of defini-
tions, and from my own observation of the politics of cultural pluralism: shared cultural
properties, consciousness, and boundaries. Each of these dimensions requires a brief
discussion. It is worth noting that the conceptualization of ethnicity that emerges is not
specific to Africa, but rather universal in application.
A variable roster of shared cultural aspects provides a basis for group awareness.
Language is one very frequent but not invariable element of that roster. A common
speech code provides an instant basis for mutual recognition, as well as for the perception
of difference from those speaking incomprehensible tongues. Language can become the
focal point for intense emotional attachments, especially once it is equipped with a writ-
ten form and published literature. In the words of a leading sociolinguist.
The beloved language represents the moral order. It functions similarly to
that order in ennobling human life and, in addition, it is co-constitutive of
that order.... It is also, for some, the heart of morality itself... (Fishman
1997: 20).
However, ethnic identity does not always require a distinctive language. The
intense ethnic violence and polarization in Rwanda and Burundi occurs despite the fact
that Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language (as do, in reality, Serbs and Croats). Indeed,
one defining feature of the African sociolinguistic landscape is pervasive multilingual-
ism, except in the Arabic language domain in the north. In much of Africa a large
proportion of the population (and most urbanites) will command a regional lingua franca
in addition to a maternal language, and products of the educational system will know the
European language of high politics and government. The predominance of multilingual-
ism explains why language identity lacks the sharpness of emotional attachment and
conflictual potential encountered in many parts of Europe and Asia.
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A sense of shared historical experience is another major element. In some cases,
this has been crucially formative—among the Yoruba in Nigeria, for example, the Kongo
in the two Congos and Angola, the Ganda in Uganda, or the Tutsi in Rwanda. The
Yoruba and Ganda acquired enormously influential histories written by indigenous intel-
lectuals at the beginning of the colonial era. The 1897 History of the Yoruba by church-
man Samuel Johnson was a foundational statement of the cultural unity of the group. In
the early 1900s the great Protestant katikiro (prime minister) of the Buganda kingdom,
Sir Apolo Kagwa, published a series of historical chronicles in the Luganda language that
long dominated historiography of the region and underpinned the intense cultural pride of
the Ganda people. In Rwanda the many publications of a Tutsi priest, Alexis Kagame,
transformed an oral court history into a powerful written idiom of Tutsihood. Belgian
Father J. Van Wing performed a similar function for the Kongo. These instances, one
must hasten to add, represent cases of particularly historicized identities. Not all ethnic
groups benefit from the presence of an amanuensis who can play this role of historical
authentication, an important factor in explaining the wide variation in the intensity of
ethnic consciousness.
Shared cultural practices shape ethnicity, though not all elements may be present
or salient in any given case. The mode of calculating kinship and descent (matrilineal,
patrilineal, or bilateral) is one such feature. So are rules governing marriage and other
rites of passage from one phase of life to another. Shared ritual practices give meaning to
the annual cycles of life and livelihood. Common culinary traditions and other aspects of
everyday living provide daily enactment and performance of collective attachments.
Religion may be another domain of commonality, especially for those not affiliated with
one of the universal religions; even where Islam and Christianity are implanted, localized
understandings of the supernatural and the sacred may shape group consciousness.
Collective awareness, the second defining dimension of ethnicity, is a prerequisite
for a group to exist as a social entity. The growing literature on ethnogenesis3 in Africa
provides numerous examples of group identities that play a powerful role in contempo-
rary politics but did not exist in the mid-nineteenth century. The Yoruba and Igbo in
Nigeria, to start with two potent ethnic actors in postindependence politics, did not have a
significant shared consciousness in the precolonial era. Among many other possible
examples let me mention the Ovimbundu in Angola, the Ankole in Uganda, the Kalenjin
3 The body of scholarship that deals with the origin and evolution of races or ethnic groups.
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or Luhya in Kenya, or the Ngala or Lulua in Congo-Kinshasa. Without group conscious-
ness, an ethnic category cannot become a collective actor.
Consciousness is widely expressed in kinship terms, and is historicized as a
theory of shared ancestry. Descent is notoriously malleable to serve contemporary social
or ideological purposes. But once rooted in the social consciousness, mythology con-
vincingly impersonates reality. Among the many examples that might be cited is the
instance of Arab consciousness in northern Sudan. Francis Deng argues persuasively that
small numbers of Arab migrants from across the Red Sea intermingled through marriage
with indigenous African women. With the assistance of Arab social dominance and
patrilineal descent norms, the African ancestry was erased from social memory and an
ideology of authentic Arabhood erected (Deng 1995).
Boundaries are the third crucial dimension of ethnicity. Identity is formed not
only by what is shared within the group, but critically by what differentiates it from those
beyond the cultural border. “The Other” serves as an external negative defining referent
for the self. Collective and individual consciousness is framed by who one is not, as well
as who one is. Beyond the boundary lie groups that may compete for the same resources,
and are often suspected of harboring designs of dominance. Relations are not necessarily
hostile, but stereotypical representations of “the other” tend to impute negative charac-
teristics. As one example among many, we may examine a sample of the collection of
current stereotypes gathered by noted anthropologist Maxwell Owusu in Swedru, a south-
central Ghana town in the Fante area:
the Agona are lazy, lack industry, are poor, and ... their girls are “encour-
aged” by their mothers to “prostitute” themselves to scrape a living.... The
Ewe ... are thieves.... They dabble in sorcery and evil medicine.... They are
murderers. The Ga are considered quarrelsome, big-mouthed, and bullies.
The Hausa smell, and they are unclean.... The Ashanti are proud, boastful
and unsophisticated compared to the coastal Fante (Owusu, 1970: 151).
Another dimension of the role of boundaries in sustaining collective conscious-
ness is the significance of labeling by others in constituting a group. Ethnicity most
frequently arises by conscious assertion. However, it can also emerge as a category
ascribed by others that becomes internalized over time. The Kirdi in northern Cameroon
are an example; the ethnic label originated as a term for various groups adhering to local
religions by dominant Muslim Fulani. These groups did not originally regard themselves
as sharing ethnicity. Over time, however, the designation became assimilated into the
social consciousness of those thus categorized.
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The Complexity of Ethnicity
With ethnicity thus defined as being grounded in shared cultural attributes, con-
sciousness, and boundaries, some cautionary words must follow at once. A workable
conceptual grasp of ethnicity must incorporate due recognition of its complexity. Ethnic
groups are not closed, corporate communities behaving as unified actors who respond to
a collective rationality, bouncing off one another like billiard balls. Southall’s admonition
from three decades ago is still quite relevant: “To hammer home the importance of inter-
locking, overlapping, multiple collective identities is one of the most important messages
of social and cultural anthropology” (Southall 1970: 44).
To begin with, cultural consciousness is usually multi-layered. A classic example
is the Somali instance, dramatically revealed in the decade of civil strife following the
collapse of central state institutions in 1991. Somali ethnonationalism is a strongly held
form of consciousness shared by nearly all inhabitants of the Somalia state, precariously
reborn in 2000, but also held by Somalis in the surrounding states of Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and a now-substantial diaspora in North America, Italy, and the Arabian penin-
sula. A shared language, a resonant literary tradition of oral poetry, a common religion,
and a shared sense of historical origins all sustain and reinforce a sense of Somalihood.
But Somali society is organized on the basis of a descent-based segmentation from the
cellular family unit through lineages, sub-clans, clans, and a half-dozen umbrella clan
families. The complex patterns of the 1990s conflicts, and the warring militias that
competed for control of resources and territory, were usually based on clans or sub-clans.
A different kind of example is provided by the Yoruba in Nigeria. A potent form
of ethnic solidarity operates at the Yoruba level of consciousness, which began to take
active form in the late nineteenth century with unification of the language based upon the
Oyo dialect by churchman Samuel Crowther, and Samuel Johnson’s production of a
history of “the Yoruba.” Pan-Yoruba consciousness also rests upon the mythology of an
eponymous ancestor, Oduduwa, and a primeval creation story. It was sustained by the
emergence of Yoruba cultural organizations such as the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in the
1940s, and in contemporary Nigeria by the militant Oodua People’s Congress. Yoruba
consciousness also appeared in the important diasporas that are a product of the last
decades of the slave trade, embodied in such religious cults as Candomble in Brazil and
Santeria in Cuba. However, within Yorubaland an important subsidiary layer of identity
is associated with dozens of ancestral towns and associated kingdoms, such as Ijebu,
Ibadan, Oyo, Ife, Ijesha, and others. Close inspection of Nigerian political processes since
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the 1950s reveals that the ancestral town rather than Yoruba solidarity has frequently
served as the defining element in rivalries and competition.
For many social purposes, a level of reciprocal trust and solidarity more immedi-
ate than the large ethnic aggregation is critical in reinforcing group identity. Thus, in
urban centers, one encounters innumerable hometown associations, burial groups, rotat-
ing credit clubs, and other shared endeavors directed at meeting everyday needs, based on
a more proximate affinity than that supplied by ethnicity. This layer of identity is not in
direct competition with the larger units of ethnic awareness commonly encountered in
political discussion, but a full mapping of identity politics must include local dynamics as
well.
Urban forms of identity often reflect enlarged identity categories as well, group-
ing closely related groups who come from the same general area under a common label.
In Kinshasa, migrants from up the Congo River were frequently lumped together as
“Ngala,” linked by the river trading lingua franca Lingala. Across the river in Brazzaville,
those migrating from the north were collectively labeled “Mbochi.” In Lagos, settlers
from the north who were Muslim became known as “Hausa,” whether or not this identity
would apply in the northern region from whence they had come. The label was accepted
for most Lagos purposes, and they operated as Hausa.
The sheer magnitude of the urbanization process in Africa constantly refashions
the social settings in which ethnicity is defined. Until World War II, most African cities
were small towns, few exceeding 100,000, and the overwhelming majority of the popula-
tion was rural. Today such urban centers as Kinshasa, Lagos, Abidjan, or Nairobi are
giant agglomerations with millions of inhabitants; in many countries, a third of the popu-
lation or more is urban. A further dimension of the interface between urbanization and
ethnicity appeared in the recent years of deep economic crisis. A number of formerly
employed urban workers were forced to retreat to the countryside, where they had to
renegotiate their identities and their relationships with home communities. James
Ferguson shows, in the Zambian case, how difficult this might be (Ferguson 1999).
Communal identity is thus multi-layered. It is also situational, circumstantial, and
contingent. Many routine social transactions do not evoke ethnic conflict: marketplace
exchanges, sharing public conveyances, cheering the national football team. However,
political disputes frequently lend themselves to understandings that are textured by
ethnicity. When a situation is framed by the perception that a certain outcome has been
determined by ethnic criteria, then communal consciousness is activated.
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Competitive elections are one evident example. If the competing parties are iden-
tified in the public mind with different ethnic groups, then circumstances conspire to
elevate ethnicity to a higher level of saliency. The very dramaturgy and rhythms of an
electoral campaign serve to enhance this effect. As the campaign unfolds, there is a
tendency for the rhetorical vehemence to escalate. Competing candidates are tempted to
engage in a cycle of outbidding communal claims. In the eyes of the public, the electoral
outcome can take on a winner-take-all quality, with defeat seen as catastrophic. The
campaign itself may be accompanied by growing physical violence, raising the stakes for
everyone. Election day itself is the final act of this guerrilla theater, becoming the apex of
fear and uncertainty. The possibility that competitive elections may lead to violent ethnic
confrontation was long invoked as a justification for single party or military regimes. The
fatal flaws in autocratic governance discredited these arguments in the 1990s, but African
democracy faces a major challenge in managing open competition in ways that avoid the
scenario traced above, a point to which I will return in the conclusions.
Many other more banal events in everyday life may create situations in which
ethnic identity is aroused. In many countries, some of the leading football (soccer) teams
are identified with a given community. Matches pitting two such teams against one
another are saturated with ethnic meanings. Control of a given land area, selection of a
local office-holder, and access to employment or school enrollment are other examples
where patterns of ethnic advantage may become widely perceived, inducing a situational
response. At other moments, the absence of major events catalyzing ethnic awareness can
mean a time of relative quiescence in ethnic contestations.
Situations hold significance in another sense: varying circumstances can invoke
different levels of ethnicity. Here we might return to the Somalia and Yoruba examples
mentioned earlier. In Somalia, the irredentist campaign for unification of all Somalis
under a single sovereignty, bringing war with Ethiopia in 1963 and 1977, mobilized the
solidarity of nearly all around the vision of a greater Somalia. The struggle for power
within the Somali state foregrounded the clan family, clan and subclan divisions, with
particular intensity during electoral competition in the late 1960s, the deepening opposi-
tion to the Siyad Barre regime in the 1980s, and the civil strife following state collapse in
1991. In Nigeria, in the 1960, 1965, and 1979 elections, Yorubaland was divided, with
ancestral town identities and rivalries offering an opening for parties whose primary base
was in other regions to penetrate the Yoruba zone. Yorubaland was united in 1983, and
especially 1993, and the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections after they had been
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won by a Yoruba candidate, Moshood Abiola, produced a powerful reflex of Yoruba
solidarity in an abiding anger.
Variations in Intensity
Beyond the variability in the activation of ethnicity that is contingent upon such
situations, there is an important range of differentiation in the intensity of ethnic
consciousness over time. Some forms of ethnic consciousness are grounded in a thor-
oughly elaborated cultural ideology, powerful historical mythologies, and well-invento-
ried heritage. Other forms of ethnic consciousness lack a written language, codification of
the tradition, and intellectual voices articulating that identity; in such circumstances,
ethnicity remains more diffuse and is less readily mobilized. Some identities may acquire
a degree of closure towards neighboring and rival groups that take an extreme form:
“barricaded identities,” in the interpretation of Ken Jowitt. “Social, religious, ideological,
cultural, and political connections among members who share a barricaded identity,” he
writes, “are dogmatically and hysterically defined and defended, as are disconnections
from nonmembers” (Jowitt 2001: 28). In the 1990s, Tutsi and Hutu identities in Rwanda
and Burundi took on the quality of barricaded identities, as each came to perceive the
other as a threat to its physical survival. The intensified conflict in the 1990s between
Nuer and Dinka in southern Sudan, as a part of the larger Sudanese civil war provoked by
culturally oppressive Khartoum policies, resulted in a comparable barricading of identi-
ties, well captured by Sharon Hutchinson and Jok Maduk Jok who perceive:
[since 1991] a gradual sealing off of this once permeable inter-ethnic
divide. Whereas women and children were more likely to be kidnapped
than slain by Nuer and Dinka cattle-raiders in the past, the reverse is now
true. Militarized segments on both sides of this ethnic divide have sought
to rationalize their increasing viciousness as “retaliation” for abominations
earlier experienced.... People’s concepts of ethnicity themselves have been
mutating. Nuer fighters, in particular, appear to have adopted a more
“primordialist,” if not “racialist,” way of thinking about their ethnic
“essence” in recent years (Hutchinson and Jok 2001: 15).
Prolonged inter-group violence is one major vector in creating intense forms of
identification. In the substantial zones of Africa tom by prolonged civil strife in the last
decade, evidence grows that escalation in the lethal character of weapons used in such
conflicts overpowers the cultural mechanisms available for reconciliation. Automatic
weapons have become widely available and inflict far higher casualties than combat with
spears or machetes; rituals of atonement that sufficed to restore peace after skirmishes
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with a handful of deaths cannot cope with dozens of fatalities. In a study of ethnic
violence in southwestern Ethiopia, one scholar concludes that “culturally sanctioned
reconciliation, with elders and ritual leaders of the local ethnic communities involved,
and an appeal to traditional moral values of co-operation, reciprocal exchange, and
compromise” are overwhelmed by the “effects of the new, unprecedented exercise of
violence itself: excessive in scale, cruelty, scorn for suffering and vulnerability, apparent
joy or a sense of achievement in killing others” (Abbink 2000: 546).
The degree to which cultural entrepreneurs have woven ideologies of identity is
another important factor. A written language is a crucial element, as it was in the rise of
nationalism in Europe. The written form induces the standardization of a speech code and
makes possible its utilization in the school system. A vernacular literature can emerge,
which may confer a new prestige upon the language. The accumulation and diffusion of
cultural self-knowledge is facilitated. Africa historical traditions, much more perishable if
preserved only in oral form, become accessible to a larger number than if only recorded
in a European language. The rediscovery or embellishment of a glorious past offers
resonant resources for identity construction. The mythology surrounding the conquering
hero Shaka, who transformed a minor chiefdom into a powerful state in the early nine-
teenth century, is a foundational event for Zulu cultural ideology in South Africa.
Buganda ethnonationalism weaves a powerful narrative around the historical expansion
of the kingdom; another component of the identity text is the 1900 treaty relationship
with Britain, which was seen as joining near-equals, unlike the conquered status of other
Uganda ethnic groups. Kongo ethnicity finds authentication in the achievements of the
fifteenth-century kingdom, its early standing as a Christian realm in the sixteenth century,
and its heroic struggle against Portuguese intrusion before its seventeenth-century
demise.
Arab identity in northern Africa is in a class by itself in terms of its cultural
resources, although it has been territorialized by the colonial partition and the current
state system. Arabhood draws upon its historic association with Islam and the original
Islamic conquest empire and upon the role of Arabic as scriptural and devotional
language for Muslims. Arab identity also enjoys an international range and standing
unique in Africa: there are seventeen states in Africa and West Asia in which Arabhood
defines the cultural personality of the country and a global role for the Arab state system.
At the other end of the spectrum with regard to the saliency of identity are groups
such as the Karimojong in northeastern Uganda, the Turkana in northwestern Kenya,
various small groups in southwestern Ethiopia, or the Tuareg in northern Mali and Niger,
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which have been relatively isolated from the political centers in postcolonial politics,
weakly represented among the intellectual elites, and poorly situated in terms of
economic openings. In such circumstances, the opportunity and resources to construct
strong cultural ideologies were far more limited, and thus the expression of ethnicity has
been less assertive.
Several decades ago, it was widely believed that some ethnic groups were differ-
entially endowed with the psychological propensity for modernization; emblematic of
this theory was the once-influential study of David McClelland, The Achieving Society
(1961). “Differential modernization” was the result of an aggressive pursuit of new
economic opportunity by some groups through a willingness to migrate or an eagerness
to enroll in colonial mission schools, and a corresponding reticence to engage with
modernity on the part of others. There is no doubt that some groups have far more
members of educated elites than do others, and that tensions over such imbalances have
been one driving factor in ethnic mobilization. However, the thesis that such differences
can be explained in terms of culturally or psychologically determined innate differences
has largely vanished. Opportunity did vary widely, however, partly shaped by colonial
beliefs that certain ethnic groups were especially “open to civilization” and willing
participants in the religious and administrative structures of the colonial state. Such
calculations influenced the location of mission centers and related educational facilities,
as well as recruitment by the colonial state into its auxiliary ranks. Conversely,
missions—the principal sponsors of formal schooling until nearly the end of the colonial
period—were discouraged from entering zones where Islam was well established or
populations were believed hostile. Children of pastoral peoples, by virtue of their itiner-
ant livelihood, had difficulty attending a stationary schoolhouse and thus acquiring the
credentials for social ascension.
Group Versus Individual Ethnic Consciousness
Finally, in considering the complexity of ethnicity, we need to take note of the
analytical contrast between group and individual consciousness. The very language of
analysis tends to reify the collective dimension of ethnicity; the term “ethnic group” used
in this volume and well-nigh universally carries the connotation that a constituted
“group” exists bearing the ethnic label. Weber suggests the necessary qualification that
“ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any
kind, particularly in the political sphere” (cited in Jowitt 2001: 27). Yet the abundant
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literature on ethnicity and ethnic conflict tends to privilege the group level where the
operation of communal consciousness is most visible in its effects.
The group aspect is evidently fundamental. The existence of a form of conscious-
ness shared by many individuals who acknowledge subjective ethnic membership gives
rise to a collective reference point shaping and constraining behavioral choices. Others in
the social environment readily perceive a group in action, and are quick to impute action
by their neighbors as motivated by ethnic solidarity. To give but one example, a favor
accorded by a state agent to a kinsman, which was dictated by an affinity much more
immediate than ethnicity, is likely to be interpreted by those outside the group as yet
another instance of ethnic nepotism.
But in the final analysis, much social action takes place at the individual level.
Within a given group, individuals may experience and perform ethnicity in widely variant
ways. Even in electoral contests where ethnicity becomes an influential factor, not all
members of a given group vote according to the dictates of ethnic attachment. Nor do all
individuals give equal importance to ethnic consciousness, in relation to such other social
identities as gender, social status, occupation, generation, or residential unit. The multi-
layered nature of ethnicity comes into play. So too does the possibility of multiple
cultural identities, a product of intermarriage (fairly common in urban settings), migra-
tion, or the ambiguity of ethnic boundaries. The variety of identity meaning is eloquently
captured in Jean Bazin’s summary of Bambara identity in Mali, in an essay well titled
“To Each His Own Bambara”:
Misled by the reassuring rigor of the colonial taxonomies and their inter-
nalization as a form of knowledge widely shared within urban milieux and
among educated elites in Mali today, one cannot imagine the extreme
variety of those who in one way or another ... have found themselves
designated, inventoried, honored, feared, insulted, mistreated, or extermi-
nated under this name (Bazin 1985: 97).
In taking note of the element of individual choice in the enactment of ethnicity,
one must also recognize that this flexibility is by no means unlimited. Ethnicity is in part
asserted by the individual actor. However, it is also ascribed by cultural others. The indi-
vidual is situated within the ethnic register that dominates in the larger society. Each
person is constrained to respond to classifications imposed upon him or her. Whatever
preferences in terms of privileging the ethnic dimension of identity an individual may
have in a given setting, if the others with whom interaction occurs perceive his behavior
in ethnic terms, the communal straitjacket is difficult to shed. In an ethnically sensitized
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social environment, all persons are assumed to have an ethnic identity, which will usually
be known by those in socially proximate locations. Even if one aspires to ethnic anonym-
ity, numerous cues permit others to read one’s cultural attachment, including name,
language, visible social practices, dress, or (in some parts of West Africa) facial scarifi-
cation. Thus the choices open to African individuals in identity performance are far more
constrained than the “ethnic options” documented for Euroamericans (Waters 1990).4
Related Identities: Religion
In further pursuit of the multiple layers of the identity repertoire, let us consider
several of the major alternative forms of group consciousness in their relationship to
ethnicity: religion, race, nationalism, gender, and class. Each of these patterns of social
affiliation is best understood as an alternative form of identity, usually coexisting with
ethnic consciousness. Each can have political importance, without implying the erasure
of ethnicity.
In the religious domain, since the beginning of the colonial era there has been a
radical transformation of the landscape of worship. Although Ethiopia as a historical
kingdom had a Christian core and Egypt had a Coptic minority, mission Christianity had
only a few beachheads at the time of colonial occupation. Islam was solidly implanted in
the northern part of the continent, and along the East African coast. It was also the domi-
nant religion in the congeries of kingdoms in the Sahel regions across the continent, but
did not include many rural populations in this zone. Both Christianity and Islam have
enjoyed massive expansion since the mid-nineteenth century, and the great majority of
Africans today are at least nominal followers of one or the other of these universal relig-
ions.
The nature of Christian mission action intersected with ethnicity in several
important ways. Evangelical campaigns were intensely competitive, with Catholics and
Protestants viewing each other as messengers of perdition. The universal hierarchy of the
Catholic church imposed a greater uniformity in its catechism, but the actual labor of
conversion was assigned to different mission orders whose doctrines and strategies were
not identical. On the Protestant side, sectarian divisions were transposed to Africa as the
4 In the United States, persons of European ancestry frequently have scrambled ancestry, and often
if immigration is not recent have only murky awareness of their national origins. See the engaging study by
Mary C. Waters, Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1990).
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mainstream denominations conducted separate missionary campaigns. The colonial state
mediated the rivalry by assigning particular territorial fields to the different Catholic
orders and Protestant denominations. However, the competition between the local Catho-
lic order and Protestant mission was often intense.
Thus the form of Christian religious identity was often a product of the accidents
of mission territorial assignments. In Nigeria, for example, the rivalry between Yoruba
and Igbo was partly experienced in the religious realm; Anglican missions predominated
in Yorubaland, while Catholics were stronger in Igbo country. The divisions of the
Angolan national liberation movement into three mutually hostile movements—the
Movimento Popular de Liberta^ao de Angola (MPLA), Uniao Nacional para a Inde-
pendence Total de Angola (UNITA), and the Frente Nacional de Liberta?ao de Angola
(FNLA)—were demarcated both by different ethnic and racial bases, and by the distinct
mission attachments of their leadership (respectively Catholic, Methodist, and Baptist). In
addition, the sharp animosities dividing Protestant and Catholic missions seeped into the
consciousness of their flocks; Ugandan politics since the 1950s remain marked by the
Protestant-Catholic division.
Christian evangelical endeavors required biblical translation. This in turn
compelled the early missionaries to create a written form for local languages. This very
act was an ethnolinguistic creation. In rural societies without a standard written version,
speech codes tended to phase gradually into one another, in the case of a similar language
family, and to exhibit substantial dialectical variation. Bible translation was an expensive
undertaking and necessitated strategic decisions maximizing the cost effectiveness of the
exercise. In turn, the languages chosen for biblical translation had major impact on the
subsequent evolution of identity. Standardization of closely related speech codes created
both an enlarged potential evangelical audience and the possibility of an amalgamated
identity revolving around the newly written language. Conversely, the creation of alter-
native versions by competing missions of what had normally been considered a common
language contributed to the enhancement of subgroup identities. Terence Ranger and
other scholars have shown that the saliency within the Shona ethnic group of such
subgroups as Manyika, Zezeru, Ndau, and others is closely linked to the multiple stan-
dard forms developed by different mission societies (Ranger 1989). Not least important
was the sacralized meaning that the scriptural role of the language conferred upon iden-
tity. Here one encounters a formative role in ethnic consciousness analogous to the
impact of the holy word transcribed in the emergence of nationalism in Europe. As
Adrian Hastings argues, “Biblical Christianity both undergirds the cultural and political
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world out of which the phenomenon of nationhood and nationalism as a whole developed
and in a number of important cases provided a crucial ingredient for the particular history
of nations and nationalisms” (Hastings 1997: 4).
Not all language standardization projects succeeded. An intriguing case in point is
the repeated failures of mission schemes to introduce a standard version of Igbo. The first
experiment in distilling a written form, known as “Union Igbo,” was based upon infor-
mants among the Igbo emigre community in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The dialect upon
which the unification was erected was distant from the speech forms in the major centers
of Igboland, and despite energetic mission promotion this version was never accepted.
Not till much later was a more successful written standard created. In the meantime, early
generations of Igbo schoolchildren were educated in English and regarded this language
as their vehicle of uplift. This pattern sharply contrasted with Yoruba language develop-
ment, whose Oyo form used by Crowther as the basis for a common standard won quick
acceptance. The linguistic dimension of Yoruba consciousness was subsequently far
more central.5
Christian identity is for the most part experienced through the congregation and
does not usually stand apart from or override ethnicity. The older mainline Protestant
congregations had church structures that operated at the territorial level, while Catholi-
cism had a global structure. Conflicts pitting Christians against Muslims—recently
evident in Nigeria and Tanzania—can produce a reflex of religious solidarity, but most
frequently the ethnic congregation ties religious experience to ethnicity. The greatest
degree of Christian religious energy in recent years is expressed through diverse evan-
gelical and pentecostal churches, by their nature localized and fragmented.
Islam relates to ethnicity somewhat differently. The theology emphasizes the
importance of the umma
,
or the world community of Islam, in ways that have no contem-
porary Christian counterpart (although having a parallel in the res publica Christiana of
medieval times). The central liturgical and scriptural role of Arabic meant that there was
no motivation to allocate a sacred role to other African languages, although some such as
Swahili or Hausa had transliterations in the Arabic script. Here and there ethnicity deter-
mines where the Friday prayers will be observed; southern Nigeria is an example where
one finds the ethnic mosque. But more than Christianity, Islam has been a vessel of iden-
tity that can partially mute ethnic differences. In northwest Africa, the relatively subdued
5 See the detailed history of early Igbo standardization efforts in van den Bersselaar 1997.
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difference between Arab and Berber populations is partly explained by the shared Islamic
culture. As well, the elevation its liturgical status confers upon Arabic explains the grad-
ual Arabization of Berber groups over the centuries. In Eritrea, coastal populations (few
of whom are of Arab ethnicity) feel a strong affinity through their shared Islamic identity
and insist on an official status for Arabic rather than their indigenous languages. South of
the Sahara, in those countries where the Muslim majority is very large (such as Senegal,
Mali, or Niger), the role played by ethnicity in politics is more diffuse than in the lands
further to the north.
Islam is not a monolithic form of religious identity. In a number of countries,
affiliation with one or another of the major Sufi orders, such as Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya,
Khatmiyya, Ansar or the Mourides, which are not closely tied to ethnicity, provides a
significant differentiation of identity. So too does the militant form of Islamism reflected
by such movements as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan, or its counterpart in
Algeria. But there are also practices in the repertory of Islamic ritual through which
shared attachment to the umma is performed, such as the five daily prayers. Particularly
influential is the obligation, if possible, to undertake the haj, or pilgrimage to Mecca.
This journey, once an arduous adventure requiring years of travel, is brought within the
reach of the multitude by air transport, and in several countries by the public subsidy of
the expense. The emotional impact of this encounter with tens of thousands of fellow
Muslims from all over the world is immense, revealing a comradeship in religious devo-
tion far transcending ethnicity.
Racial Identity
Racial identity provides another trans-territorial and pan-ethnic constitution of the
self. To grasp its origins and significance, we need to recall its early connection to the
Atlantic slave trade, the swelling of African diaspora populations in the Western hemi-
sphere, and their hostile categorization in racial terms by dominant society. By the time
that colonial occupation was imposed upon Africa, racism was firmly implanted in the
European psyche. The physically visible differentiating attributes of skin color, facial
features, and hair texture were merely the external markings of a comprehensive inferior-
ity in the eyes of the colonial occupant, who saw indigenous peoples as primitive, savage,
pagan. A whole new dimension to the virulence of racism came from the late nineteenth-
century addition of a pseudoscientific theory of racial hierarchy. The supremacy of Euro-
peans in warfare, power, and technology was believed to reflect a Darwinian survival of
the fittest, and to prove the racist premise of a biological European superiority.
UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY 19
With the partition of Africa and political organization of European occupation, the
colonial state constituted its African subjects along three axes: racial, territorial, and
ethnic. All Africans fell within the racial classification, upon which the colonial state
erected a comprehensive array of discriminatory regulations. The premise of inferiority
and backwardness of subject peoples justified systematic segregation, characteristic of all
colonial systems, and a battery of arbitrary controls enforcing imperial hegemony and
translating African labor into a revenue stream for the colonial state (through the imposi-
tion of head taxes, forced labor, and coerced recruitment for European enterprises). The
presumed primitivity of the subject instilled in colonial minds the premise of the perpet-
ual childhood of the Africans, justifying in turn a pseudo-parental tutelage that extin-
guished all rights.
There is no evidence that racial categories of identity existed in Africa prior to the
slave trade and colonial rule. However, for both diaspora Africans and colonial subjects,
the massive imprint of racial classification compelled an internalization of blackness as
an identity (or a sense of racial otherness for light-skinned North Africans). Even though
the rigidity of the racial divide began to relax in the final years of colonial occupation, the
consciousness linked to race was by then deeply implanted. In riposte, initially under the
intellectual and political leadership of diaspora Africans, particularly from the Caribbean
and the United States, the stigmatization of race was transformed into an ideology of
solidarity and liberation in the form of Pan-Africanism. This doctrine held strong sway
among African intellectuals of the diaspora, whose ethnicity was mostly erased by the
generations of separation from the continent, and whose territorial origins were unknown.
The series of Pan-African conferences organized between 1900 and World War n, which
helped give doctrinal definition to the idea of African racial solidarity, were all domi-
nated by diaspora Africans.
With the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress, leadership in the Pan-African
movement passed to the emergent nationalist intelligentsia in Africa. The struggle for
liberation from colonial subjugation initially was cast in the form of continental libera-
tion, implicitly building on the “We are all Africans” notion of racial solidarity, with as
corollary the vision that Africa had a vocation of political unity. The Manchester
Congress excoriated “artificial divisions and territorial boundaries created by the Imperi-
alist Powers.” The 1958 All-African Peoples’ Congress in Accra denounced “artificial
frontiers drawn by the imperialist Powers to divide the peoples of Africa,” demanding
“the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date” (cited in Touval 1972:
22-23).
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Territoriality, one soon learned, was not so easily dispensed with; independence
was won through the frame of the colonial partition. But the dream of African unity,
which originated in the shared experience of racial oppression, remained a vital factor in
African politics. In 1963 the vision of Pan-Africanism found institutional expression in
the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Despite the many disappointments in the
limited frame for inter-state cooperation embodied by the OAU, Africa as an idea is well
implanted in the popular consciousness. Evidence of its resiliency appeared in 1999,
when a new proposal for radical acceleration of the process of African unification was
launched by Libyan autocrat Muammar Qadhafy. The African Union project to supplant
the OAU with a greatly enhanced structure of African integration was formally launched
in 2001, although the practical difficulties of full implementation will doubtless limit full
realization of its aims.
Identity cast in racial terms thus has a powerful resonance. Although the diasporic
African populations cannot directly participate in the political pursuit of integration or
unification on the continent, in the intellectual realm discourses of racial solidarity and
liberation originating in the diaspora continue to play a constitutive role in notions of
African solidarity. The decades of active struggle for African liberation from colonial
occupation and white racial rule rolled southward from Sudan, Tunisia, and Morocco in
1956, Ghana in 1957, eighteen countries in 1960, down to the final overthrow of apart-
heid in South Africa, finalized with the transition of 1994. The strongly racialist texture
to white rule in the final redoubts of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself kept the
theme of racial solidarity and liberation in the political foreground.
From the vantage point of the Pan-African perspective and some of its spinoffs
(such as the Afrocentricity debate in the United States), ethnicity is apparently an identity
of secondary worth. The manipulation of ethnicity as an apartheid weapon in Namibia
and South Africa, suggesting through the “homeland” policy that the ethnic structure was
the sole acceptable site for subordinate participation by Africans, linked ethnic
consciousness to the apparatus of apartheid oppression and channeled southern African
liberation ideology in the direction of African solidarity. Although racial consciousness
did not necessarily stand in contradiction to ethnic pride, the more exalted ambitions of
African solidarity and unification implied a subordination of ethnicity to the higher pur-
poses of a Pan-African perspective.
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Territorial Identity
The African subjects of the colonial state were also imprinted with a territorial
identity. The specific legal and governmental framework within which colonial oppres-
sion was experienced was the given territorial unit. Though the colonial state invested no
resources in fostering a sense of territorial solidarity, the formulation of grievances and
the organization of protest necessarily addressed the unit of governance through which
colonial sovereignty was exercised. Even in the interwar period, growing numbers of
Africans came to experience colonial occupation in the emergent multi-ethnic urban
centers, or reflect upon its misdeeds in secondary boarding schools or eventually univer-
sities that operated outside the ethnically defined rural units of “native administration.”
Particularly after World War II, resentments at colonial injustices congealed into the ideal
of political independence as the imperative remedy. Effective challenge to the colonial
state could most effectively occur at the territorial level. In turn, the framers of African
nationalist ideologies had to rebut the colonial dismissal of their claims as the irresponsi-
ble agitation of a tiny educated elite who ignored the ethnic diversity that made self-
government impractical. While the mobilization of a mass following was indispensable to
realizing the dream of independence; asserting the primacy of a territorial solidarity was
necessary to this end.
Thus, while ethnicity played an important role in the struggle for independence in
a number of countries, at the ideological level its moral value was denied. Anticolonial
nationalism incarnated a higher level of solidarity; the political expression of ethnicity
played into the hands of the malevolent schemes of the colonizing powers to delay or
avert independence by fostering division. After independence was won, the new rulers
engaged in a vigorous process of “nation-building”: instilling in the subject-become-
citizen the belief that the supreme form of solidarity belonged to the sovereign territorial
state. The ideology of the nation-state, then ascendant throughout the world, shaped the
identity strategies of newly independent states. National integration was a crucial prereq-
uisite to achieve the other goals of independence, above all rapid economic transforma-
tion.
The resources available to the state were considerable. The educational system,
over which new states invariably reinforced their control and rapidly expanded, was a
powerful pedagogical instrument. School curricula were revised and infused with nation-
building content: national histories, focus upon territorial geography and culture, local-
ization of illustration and example across the board. The schoolhouse was a favored site
for everyday performances of national identity: flag-raising, singing the newly created
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national anthems, celebrating national holidays. To grasp the importance of these seem-
ingly banal practices, one needs to recollect the enormous influence of the common
school in the United States in propagating the idea of an American nation to successive
generations of immigrants, or to recall that until the advent of mass education in nine-
teenth-century France, only a modest fraction of the rural French population had some
active consciousness of French identity (see Weber 1979).
The postcolonial state had other nation-building weapons in its arsenal. Until the
1990s, the major media were government monopolies. Radio, television, and the
government newspaper were conscious instruments of nation-building. So too was the
national football team in its participation in such major international competitions as the
World Cup or the African Cup of Nations. In subliminal ways, “nation” was also
communicated through postage stamps and the coinage. This everyday, unreflected
notion of a national attachment is well captured by Michael Billig as “banal nationalism”:
In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national
place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so
continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The
metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being
consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed
on the public building (Billig 1985: 8).
The cumulative impact of this internalization of a territorial consciousness described as
nationalism is demonstrated by the fact that, even in countries where states had degener-
ated into venal predators and public order had dissolved over extended periods in the
1990s (for example, Congo-Kinshasa, Sierra Leone, and Somalia), there is little call for a
territorial fragmentation that no existing force could avert if ethnic or other demands for
breakup resonated.6
Although territorial nationalism in Africa represents itself as a higher order of
affiliation than ethnic solidarity, the architects of the nation in recent years have carefully
avoided confronting ethnicity. The illusion of possible erasure of ethnicity, implied in the
Toure quotation at the beginning, quickly vanished. In its place came a sometimes reluc-
tant acknowledgment of the enduring affective power of ethnic solidarity, combined with
the desire to cage it in the private realm and ban its invocation in the public square. In
6 The emergence of a functioning Somaliland may appear an exception to this proposition.
However, Somaliland is essentially the restoration of a prior colonial unit, British Somaliland; if a viable
and inclusive government for Somalia can be institutionalized, there is reason to believe Somaliland would
ultimately rejoin.
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contrast with most European and Asian states, the concept of the nation had to be rigor-
ously territorial and ideological, separate from any ethnic referent (save in the Arab
states, Somalia, and the small southern African states with a single dominant group,
Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana). On the one hand, this denies “nation-building”
projects the powerful resource of language and ethnic culture as integrative instruments.
On the other, it explains why claims of ethnonational self-determination have been infre-
quent in Africa, in sharp contrast to Eurasia. Separatist movements that have arisen in
Africa (for example, Casamance in southern Senegal, southern Sudan, Biafra in Nigeria)
have almost invariably grounded their claims upon some existing administrative subdivi-
sion, not ethnic self-determination. In most cases today, ethnic self-awareness is not
perceived as standing in contradiction to national identity, a pattern strikingly dissimilar
to much of Eurasia. The “nation” represents itself as a purely political and territorial
identity, without ethnic content; as such, it can claim allegiance of the citizenry without
implying any renunciation of ethnicity.
Finally, the postcolonial state, in its nation-state project, confronts the legacy of
the third leg of the triple classification of the subject (racial, territorial, ethnic) by its
colonial predecessor. Ethnicity was deeply embedded in the structures of rule by colonial
imposition of its ethnic codification upon the structures of local administration. Only
those who escaped the grid of rural governance could partly elude ethnic subject status,
an observation central to the influential study by Mahmood Mamdani:
more than any other colonial subject, the African was containerized, not as
a native, but as a tribesperson. Every colony had two legal systems: one
modem, the other customary. Customary law was defined in the plural, as
the law of the tribe, and not in the singular, as a law for all natives....
roughly as many sets of customary laws [existed] as there were said to be
tribes (Mamdani 1996: 22).
Although a number of states have endeavored to dissolve or dilute the ethnic containers
serving as a basis for local administration, the familiarity of long usage may create obsta-
cles. For example, Uganda—a key case in the Mamdani study—has divided the 12 ethnic
districts of colonial administration into 45, with more promised in the 2001 electoral
campaign. The main goal was to break the larger and more assertive groups into multiple
units, thus reducing their capacity to act as ethnic collective advocates. But agitation
persists to return larger groups to a single administrative jurisdiction, or to create new
ones for small groups.
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Gender and Ethnicity
Gender intersects and overlaps with identity in a very different way. Here the
problematic query is whether gender holds any significance for ethnicity. Otherwise put,
the question is whether men and women experience and enact ethnic identity differently.
The universality of patriarchy, albeit in varying forms, frames the issue. The heart of the
matter, then, lies in whether women, given the asymmetries in the gender matrix, find
their unequal status shapes their relationship to ethnic consciousness in any way.
The subject has arisen only recently, as feminist scholars began to interrogate the
relationship between gender and nationalism (see Peterson 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997). In
its strongest form, the thesis is that nationalism (and by implication ethnicity) is inher-
ently gendered. Its historic association with warfare and violence irremediably links its
language and symbolism with masculinity. The potent claims to exclusive loyalty
imposed by militant forms of nationalism silently enhance the authority of the male lead-
ership of the movement. The woman is merely protector of the home and producer of
new children to fill the nationalist ranks. Nationalism thus becomes one more strand in
the fabric of patriarchy.
These arguments only partly translate into the language of ethnicity. However,
there are several social domains where ethnic practice may implicate gender inequality.
Particularly where descent is patrilineal—the most frequent norm—the social ancestry of
the female becomes largely erased in subsequent generations. In interethnic marriage the
male ethnic identity normally prevails. In many areas, bridewealth payments escalated in
monetary value, creating a male disposition to preserve the investment and limit female
autonomy. Other kinds of female disadvantage, in land rights, inheritance, and property
control, were asserted as cultural heritage intrinsic to ethnic ideologies. As a conse-
quence, Vail argues that:
an emphasis on the need to control women and a stress on the protection
of the integrity of the family came to be intrinsic to both ethnic ideologies
and the actual institutional practices.... Ethnicity’s appeal was strongest for
men, then, and the Tswana proverb to the effect that “women have no
tribe” had a real—if unintended—element of truth (Vail 1989: 15).
In suggesting that gender may produce differential experience of ethnicity, one
needs to qualify the point by recognizing the important ways in which any distinction
may be effaced. Within the context of ethnic polarization, situational constraints lead men
and women to react in similar ways. The necessary reciprocities of shared household
induces an avoidance of ethnic distinction within conjugal units. Still, Aili Tripp docu-
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merits the striking finding that women in Uganda are far more successful than their male
counterparts in sustaining effective cooperation within associations that cut across ethnic
lines, implying that ethnicity is less pivotal in social action for women (Tripp 2000).
An intriguing example of the female rejection of ethnicity as a legitimate principle
of distribution is found in the passionate denunciation of politics as an ethnic competition
for shares of the “national cake” (a metaphoric representation I examine in more detail
below) by Winnie Byanyima, a leading political figure, in Uganda’s 1994 constitutional
debates:
Most of us bom to work in kitchens know that, where a cake is, there must
be a baker. So, I find discussion around sharing and eating the cake child-
ish at the very least and irresponsible, selfish and parasitic at worst....
Struggling for the trappings of power is now at the center stage, it has
become acceptable and even fashionable. Values which we women care
about such as caring, serving, building, reconciling, healing, and sheer
decency are becoming absent from our political culture. This eating is
crude, self-centered, egoistic, shallow, narrow and ignorant.... a culture
which we must denounce and do away with if we are to start a new nation
(cited in Tripp 2001).
Ethnicity and Social Class
Finally, one may ask whether ethnicity bears any relationship to identities linked
to social class. The rich stew of debates over understanding social class in Africa cannot
be adequately sampled in these pages. Suffice it to say that class in Africa cannot find
adequate understanding through imported categories derived from Marxism or Western
sociology. Despite claims of a number of the independence generation of political leaders
that social class did not exist among indigenous Africans, there is a keen sense in the
popular mind of structured inequality, of “big people” and “little people.” This closely
reflects a postcolonial reality; whereas in most colonial territories Africans had few
possibilities of accumulation (giving rise to the theory that Africans were not divided by
social class), since independence a small minority has acquired great wealth. The most
important postcolonial avenue to unequal enrichment and the social status that accompa-
nies it is through access or proximity to state power.
There is some degree of consciousness of shared status and common interest on
the part of those who have accumulated wealth and power since independence. However,
this group is also firmly linked to ethnic communities through networks of clientele. In
return for some flow of resources and influence, the patron can rely upon the social and
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political backing of the clientele. These webs of patron-client linkages honeycomb politi-
cal society, and through their reciprocities constitute one of the building blocks of ethnic
community. In a number of countries, their importance has doubtless increased with the
spread of informal markets and a parallel economy.
In the urban centers, economic decline or stagnation in many countries has
produced some other social strata whose common material situation creates a sense of
shared interests. Substantial numbers of public sector employees, who once enjoyed a
comfortable middle-class existence, find the real value of their salaries sharply eroded by
inflation and their well-being undermined by the harsh economic reform medicine of
structural adjustment programs. The status attached to relatively high levels of educa-
tional attainment that qualified them for the positions they held persists, but their impov-
erishment labels them, to borrow a Ghanaian term, as “the respectable poor.” Urban
workers—and especially the large numbers of officially unemployed who find precarious
survival in the informal sector—share the marginality but not the residual status of the
respectable poor. Even more volatile and discontented are the huge cohorts of urban
youth who face dismal prospects for social advance.
The social turbulence in capital cities that provided important impetus to the wave
of democratization in the early 1990s came in large measure from these categories. Urban
street action was not normally marked by ethnicity at the beginning of the democratic
transitions, although later in the decade armed ethnic youth militia appeared in several
countries (Congo-Brazzaville in 1993 and 1997, Nigeria in 2000). Although collective
social action organized around the shared discontents of material deprivation can occur,
the anthropology of anger can also easily flow along ethnic lines.
In rural areas, the defining issues of social competition tended to pit communities
against one another. The most frequent of such disputes revolved around land rights,
intensified by growing population densities, the dislocation of groups by civil violence or
drought, or migration patterns. These kinds of conflicts at the turn of the new century
were particularly salient in the Great Lakes region, resulting in a complex mosaic of
ethnic clashes. Rural populations are well aware of their relative poverty and their
distance from power; however, a common sociological location does not necessarily
crystallize into an active form of common “peasant” consciousness reaching across the
boundaries of ethnic consciousness.
In sum, social class consciousness in Africa is indisputably present but diffusely
held and weakly articulated. The categories through which inequality is popularly under-
UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY 27
stood are not the same as those commonly used in Western class analysis. To unravel the
class factor in African politics, one needs to interrogate the social consciousness to
discover the language through which hierarchies of well-being are understood.
Whatever its African categorizations, class lacks the powerful affective properties
associated with ethnic awareness. Ethnicity readily supplies a discourse of collective self-
hood immediately recognizable to its members. The emotive attachments readily evoked
by ethnicity have no counterpart in class consciousness in Africa. The ultimate tragedy in
human encounters is genocide, to which Africa has had tragic exposure in Rwanda and
Burundi. Genocide is the attempted liquidation of an ethnic community, a word originat-
ing as a descriptor for the Holocaust. No comparable word has been coined for lethal
class conflict, because it lacks the psychic properties to rise to genocidal levels.
Approaches to Understanding Ethnicity
To conclude this chapter, I turn to the three major schools of analysis of ethnicity,
which have taken clear form in the last two decades: primordialism, instrumentalism, and
constructivism. Most analysts draw upon all three theoretical streams, but they are
distinctive perspectives. Each of these conceptual orientations sensitizes us to important
dimensions of the complex social phenomenon of ethnicity.
Primordialist approaches stress the deeply held nature and psychological proper-
ties of ethnicity. Older understandings of ethnic identity tended implicitly towards a
primordialist stance, although without using the term. Ethnicity tended to be perceived as
a timeless essence, whose origins and dynamics did not require close interrogation.
However, a fuller brief for this approach found expression when its premises were chal-
lenged by the other perspectives. It was necessary to explain not just the existence of
ethnic consciousness, but the singular intensities of emotional attachment it might evoke.
In the words of A.L. Epstein, purely instrumental interpretations of ethnicity fail to
explain “the powerful emotional charge that appears to surround or to underlie so much
of ethnic behavior; and it is this affective dimension of the problem that seems to me
lacking in so many recent attempts to tackle it” (Epstein 1978: xi). In one of the most
systematic elaborations of a primordialist approach, Harold Isaacs stressed the “ineffable
significance” and “peculiarly coercive powers” of ethnic identity, whose social energy
derives from their psychological essence: “a desperate effort to regain the condition of
life in which certain needs were met, to get behind walls that enclose them once more, if
only in their minds, in a place where they can feel they belong, and where, grouped with
their kind, they can regain some measure of what feels like physical and emotional
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safety” (Isaacs 1975: 28). Human beings had a basic need for social anchoring, a
reticence before moral aloneness.
Other scholars of a primordialist persuasion stress the innateness of cultural
understandings. Humans, argued Clifford Geertz, are bom as incomplete animals, who
fulfill themselves through the culture they create, which becomes a primordial “given” of
social existence (Geertz 1975). Culture becomes linked to ancestry; ideologies of descent
tie the ritual and social practices of the group to generations past extending back into the
mists of history.
Yet another dimension of primordiality identified by its most enthusiastic propo-
nents goes beyond culture into sociobiology. Ethnic solidarity, in this view, is “an
extended form of kin selection,” arising as basic instinctual response (van den Berghe
1987). An even extended claim for the biological basis of ethnicity is entered by Paul
Shaw and Yuwa Wong, who argue that the propensity to group consciousness and soli-
darity is imprinted in the genetic code, as a result of the prehistorical imperative of small
human groups to cooperate to subsist, and to maintain a mutual recognition of the kindred
as a condition for survival in an environment when attack by others was a constant threat
(Paul and Wong 1989).
Although sociobiological theories attributing ethnicity to our genetic properties
take us further than we need to go here, some aspects of identity politics require recourse
to the corpus of primordialist theory. The power of the emotional attachments attached to
ethnicity and the force of the animosities towards a hostile ethnic other in a polarized
setting call for attention to the psychological properties of identity. Put another way, an
inescapable social fact is that ordinary ethnic actors tend toward a primordialist assump-
tion, rarely interrogating the origins of the identity or reflecting on whether their commu-
nal action may be merely circumstantial.7
A second approach, instrumentalism, centers upon the use of identity as a weapon
in the competitive pursuit of material advantage. Here one may evoke a widely encoun-
tered metaphorical representation of politics originating in Nigeria. The essence of poli-
tics, in this view, is “slicing the national cake.” In this delicious and quintessential^
instrumental imagery, the object of ethnic action is eating, a proposition that triggered the
7 Interesting evidence on this point is provided by Gil-White’s 1999 essay, “How Thick Is
Blood?” The responses of people in the Kazakh-Mongol ethnic border zone of Mongolia to an array of
questions on kinship and identity clearly demonstrated that his rural respondents were natural
primordialists.
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wrath of the Ugandan feminist leader cited earlier. The meal must come from the
resource pool controlled by the state. Nigerian oil and other revenues, by imaginative
metamorphosis, assume the form and properties of a cake: sweet to the taste, desired in
the largest possible serving. The relative size of the slices is visible to all; those disap-
pointed by smallish portions look in hungry anger at those whose plates hold outsized,
icing-laden slices. These relative inequities lead in turn to ask whose hand holds the
knife; one may presume that the ethnic affiliation and preferences of the slicer will influ-
ence the size of the portions served to different groups.
The “national cake” metaphor points us towards the two crucial faces of instru-
mentalist politics: distribution and domination. Ethnic competition is powered by the
desire to maximize group returns. Relative shares of material benefits are determined in
the political realm and outcomes are strongly influenced by the relative power of the
ethnic contenders. Securing political dominance assures that the material interests of the
group will be safeguarded. Furthermore, ethnic solidarity in competition permits over-
coming the “free rider” problem in social action: the disposition of some to remain aloof
from group action because they will share the benefits whether they participate or not.
When instrumental ethnic mobilization takes place, the visibility of membership permits
the communal leadership to monitor and enforce group involvement, preventing “free
riding” (remaining on the sidelines in the expectation of receiving the benefits of group
action whether or not one participates). 8
Instrumentalist analysis, although not labeled as such until the 1980s, quickly
gained momentum in the 1970s. The kinds of ethnic politics that became visible in Africa
as independence approached were closely tied to competitive struggles for political
power and the access to resources that went with it. Listening to ethnic voices in the
political arena, one could hardly escape the conclusion that ethnicity was utilized as a
mobilizing weapon in the competitive pursuit of material advantage.
The dramatic speed with which instrumentalism elbowed primordialism aside for
a time has other explanations in the sociology of knowledge. Instrumentalism permitted
the incorporation of ethnicity into two powerfully influential paradigms, Marxism and
rational choice, which for different reasons were allergic to the acknowledgment of
cultural pluralism. The password opening Marxism and rational choice to instrumentalist
ethnicity was the materialist premise common to all three approaches. For Marxism, if
8 For examples of instrumentalism in pure form, see Rothschild 1981; Olzak and Nagel 1986.
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ethnicity was essentially about material competition, then communal mobilization
became “real,” just misguided. Ethnicity could be seen as a form of false consciousness,
which stood in the path of the more fundamental basis of solidarity constituted by social
class. For the rational choice theorist, the core premise of the self-interested, rationally
calculating individual unit of politics could be extended to a group logic. In the words of
one of the leading rational choice practitioners, Russell Hardin, “self-interest can often
successfully be matched with group interest” (Hardin 1995: 5).
A third perspective emerged in the 1980s, constructivism (sometimes called
“constructionism”), which to some extent grew out of instrumentalism. One of the
assumptions of an instrumentalist perspective was that ethnicity was situational. Its acti-
vation and saliency depended upon circumstances that evoked ethnic identity in popular
perceptions of the social situation. This suggests the value of further exploring the
sources of ethnic consciousness, if the assumption of a timeless quality to the phenome-
non is breached. A particularly seminal work pointing in this direction was Benedict
Anderson’s classic work. Imagined Communities (1983). Anderson’s creative reflections
on the novelty of a form of consciousness that instills a robust belief in shared commu-
nity among millions of individuals who cannot have personal knowledge of each other
stimulated a new concern with the question of its origins. Once ethnicity is understood as
a collective human act of creative invention rather than a timeless essence, many impor-
tant new questions emerge. If ethnicity is at some point “invented,” and evolves over
time, then the premise of its necessary stability and permanence vanishes. Identity can
become understood as contingent, fluctuating, and fragmented, as well as circumstantial.
By the 1990s, constructivism had become established as a mainstream model of
ethnicity, perhaps the most influential of the three streams. Even scholars once associated
with a mainly primordialist orientation, such as Anthony Smith, conceded ground to
constructivism.9 The rapid diffusion of constructivism, as with instrumentalism earlier,
finds partial explanation in a predisposing intellectual climate. The appearance of diverse
currents of postmodernism, and their potent influence within anthropology, was impor-
tant in the reception of constructivism. Postmodernism, like constructivism, privileged
the contingency and fragmentation of meanings in human agency. With the collapse of
Communism demolishing the credibility of Marxism as a political doctrine and damaging
its standing as social theory, many of its erstwhile practitioners migrated to some form of
9 Among the many works by this distinguished scholar, as a statement of his earlier views we may
cite Smith 1986.
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postmodernism or “cultural studies.” Also worth noting is the parallel emergence in the
field of international relations of an influential approach of “constructivism”; although its
content was somewhat different, many of its assumptions were similar.
However, most contemporary analysis of comparative cultural pluralism avoids
exclusive commitment to any of the three approaches described above. At the same time,
the explicit recognition of these alternative paradigms influences current scholarship in
important ways. To grasp the dynamics of such catastrophic mass ethnic killings as those
in Rwanda and Burundi in 1993-1994, merely instrumentalist perspectives cannot
suffice. Some understanding as to the reasons behind the emotional content of ethnic
attachments—the deep fears and anxieties that may in settings of intense conflict escalate
into hatred and demonization of the ethnic other—is indispensable to deciphering the
tragedy. But at an earlier phase of the Tutsi-Hutu ethnic encounters at the beginning of
the 1990s, group relationships did closely fit with an instrumentalist interpretation of a
struggle over distribution and domination defined by ethnic consciousness. And a
complete interpretation of the genocidal disasters necessitates an examination of the
origins of Tutsi and Hutu as social categories (see Newbury 2001), and how they
hardened as collective representations during the colonial period under the constructivist
impact of administrative and mission policies, then degenerated into “barricaded
identities” in Jowitt’s telling phrase, “dogmatically and hysterically defined and
defended” (Jowitt 2001: 28).
In the closing chapter, I return to consider some particular aspects of ethnicity and
politics in Africa. Also awaiting our consideration are formulas for the accommodation of
ethnic diversity. But first, we turn to scrutiny of ethnic politics in three countries, to offer
some empirical content to the comparative discussion presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 2
Ethnicity at Low Intensity: The Tanzanian Case
Ethnic Geography
Tanzania stands out in the African firmament as a state in which cultural
pluralism has played only a subdued role in the political process, in spite of pronounced
ethnic diversity. 1 The sharp contrast with most other African states beckons explanation.
By way of example of the strikingly low saliency of ethnicity, I may note a recent effort
to ascertain the ethnic origins of Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. Although he has
been in office since 1995, various informants who were queried—Tanzanian specialists
and citizens—although familiar with his regional roots, could not recite his Makua
ethnicity. One wonders whether any citizens in neighboring Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi or Congo-Kinshasa would be unaware of the ethnicity of their head of state.
Tanzania is composed of two distinct components. By far the largest in area and
population is the mainland territory formerly known as Tanganyika. In 1964, this territory
incorporated the previously separate adjoining islands of Zanzibar as an autonomous
region. The country was renamed “Tanzania” to reflect the amalgamation.
Some invoke geopolitical factors in explanation of the low intensity of ethnic
conflict on the mainland, and these are certainly significant. The continental part of
Tanzania has an unusual population distribution, with areas of higher density strung
around the borders, and a relatively sparsely populated central core. Groups such as the
Chagga, with precociously large intelligentsias and an early sense of their group identity,
lived in a particularly fertile and productive border region around Mount Kilimanjaro,
and were not motivated to migrate in large numbers to the capital for employment. The
Zanzibar segment of Tanzania has intense identity conflicts, but the separation of the
islands ensures that their impact does not spill over onto the mainland to any great extent.
The capital city in many African states is a cockpit of ethnic conflict and very diverse in
population; in Dar es-Salaam, the diversity is diluted by the strong overlay of the coastal
Swahili Muslim culture, not attached to any given ethnic community. However
significant these unusual geographical determinants may be, we need to look further in
1 This chapter is largely drawn from Aili Mari Tripp and Crawford Young, “The Accommodation
of Cultural Diversity in Tanzania,” in Daniel Chirot and Martin Seligman, eds., Ethnopolitical Warfare:
Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions Washington: American Psychological Association, 2001),
259-74.
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historical sociology to unravel this puzzle. In so doing, we need to take note of the racial
and religious dimensions of cultural identity as well as ethnicity in this and the following
two country cases. These cognate forms of consciousness played decisive roles at
particular moments in the patterns of identity politics, interacting in complex ways with
the ethnic dimension.
Precolonial Baseline
To set a precolonial baseline for identity mapping, one may note that the social
landscape on the mainland before colonial occupation was dominated by localized
descent groups. Also important was the village residential unit, although in many areas
people lived in scattered homesteads rather than villages. Some sizable kingdoms existed,
especially in the north, that also served as a focus for identity. Some of the ethnic
categories that became predominant later existed in the precolonial period, but were
loosely held and weakly articulated. The notion of ethnicity would have provided little
value in understanding the complex patterns of conflict and cooperation among these
populations soon to be enclosed together within a colonial jurisdiction.
Zanzibar had a different history. Long an Indian Ocean trading trade entrepot, in
1840 the islands came under the rule of an immigrant Omani Arab dynasty. A period of
significant Arab immigration followed, joining a small but prosperous Indian mercantile
elite. The bulk of the population was African, whose numbers swelled after Arab clove
plantations led to large-scale slave importation from the mainland. Over time, a degree of
mixing of Arab and African occurred, and the dominant language became Swahili. The
Zanzibar sultanate had loose suzerainty over the East African coast.
In the decades immediately preceding colonial occupation two important identity
forming processes emerged. Zanzibari merchants, often called “Arabs” but in reality
mostly Swahili-speaking Afro-Arabs, began extending slave and ivory trading networks
into the interior, reaching as far as Malawi and eastern Congo-Kinshasa. A string of
trading outposts emerged, which became nodes of Swahili diffusion and Islamic
conversion. A handful of Christian missions also began functioning in some coastal and
interior locations, attracting small clusters of converts around their stations.
Colonial Rule and Cultural Identity
In 1885, Germany proclaimed sovereignty over mainland Tanzania (then
including Rwanda and Burundi). In 1890, Zanzibar became a British protectorate. An
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entirely novel form of governing structures was imposed upon the mainland population,
while Britain ruled indirectly, through the Arab dynasty. In German East Africa, the key
African intermediaries were drawn from coastal Muslim Swahili-speaking elites, mostly
posted in areas to which they were not indigenous. The earlier Afro-Arab trading centers
became garrison towns, along with newly created state outposts; the already established
pattern of diffusion of the Swahili language and Islam around these nodal points, both
again associated with power and wealth, was reinforced. Christian mission action
redoubled, with steady growth of Christian clusters around the missionary centers. The
early availability of Swahili as an emerging lingua franca meant that there was less
imperative to reduce local languages to written form with dictionaries and grammars for
biblical translation than in most other African states. The appearance of a white settler
population and the dispersion of Asian traders into the mainland interior added a racial
dimension to evolving patterns of consciousness. However, the Germans were less driven
to employ an ethnic template in the organizing their colonial occupation than most
colonizers in Africa.
After the German defeat in World War I, German East Africa (minus Rwanda and
Burundi) became a British mandate. A very different administrative philosophy took
hold, with important consequences for African identity in Tanganyika. The British found
particular value in the notion of a “tribal Africa” awaiting classification and organization.
The Swahili agents of German rule were set aside in favor of “natural rulers” drawn from
ethnic agglomerations discovered by the colonizer. Such major ethnic categories as
“Chagga” (an amalgamation of seventeen distinct identity categories) or “Maasai” (ten
linguistically and culturally related groups) gained familiarity.
Whereas the theory and practice of “native administration” helped constitute
ethnicity, British language policy tended to dilute it through the energetic promotion of
Swahili as an administrative language and medium of education. By 1930, an effective
standard form of Swahili with a Latin alphabet was agreed upon (as opposed to the
writing of Swahili in Arabic script in earlier centuries), and its use in primary education
was promoted. As a result, as early as 1942, 52 percent of the Tanganyikan population
spoke Swahili, a remarkably high figure.
In terms of religious identity, both Islam and Christianity swiftly expanded their
numbers. From the relatively small clusterings around administrative centers and mission
stations in the interior, Christian converts numbered some 25 percent of the population by
the late colonial period, with 30 percent Muslims. Zanzibar, in contrast, was entirely
Muslim. Islam was also particularly well implanted in the coastal regions of the
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mainland, with Christian communities best established in the hinterland. The ethos of
intensely competitive conversion, observable in a number of countries and frequently
entangled with ethnicity, played little part in Tanzania.
However, in the racial realm, cleavages sharpened in the British period. Though
white settlers—some remaining from the German era as well as newcomers—were never
numerous (only 21,000 at the end of the colonial period), they were obstreperous in
asserting their racial superiority and demanding a political voice. Asians, almost 100,000
in late colonial times, also demanded a role in the colonial consultative machinery. A
clear racial hierarchy existed in both state and market; Europeans ruled and ran major
enterprises, Asians occupied the intermediate mercantile and professional niches, and
Africans were farmers, workers, or subaltern (subordinate) state agents.
Meanwhile in Zanzibar, identity dynamics took a different form. Arab identity
ranked at the top of a status hierarchy. However, Swahili now largely eclipsed Arabic as
a language, and racial mixing was extensive between Arab and African (but not Indian).
Thus, some blurring of the racialized Afro-Arab line of division took place. “Arab”
became more of a status than a visibly recognizable category, and was defined by
politically and socially dominant rank. Meanwhile, status differentiation also took on
deepened meanings within the African majority. Those of longstanding Zanzibar
residence adopted “Shirazi” as a label, signaling an imagined distant Persian connection.
At the same time, three quasi-ethnic labels were current: Pemba for those located in the
island bearing that name, Tumbatu for those from a neighboring small island but also
settled on Zanzibar Island, and Hadimu for those native to Zanzibar Island who had been
the principal targets of Arab land seizures in the nineteenth century; At the bottom were
the “Africans,” descended from the former slave population. Status, race, and ethnicity
thus interacted in an unstable brew in a population joined linguistically by Swahili and
religiously united by Islam (except for a portion of the Indian category), held in thrall by
an Omani ruling house by now thoroughly domesticated (and ultimately discredited) as
British clients.
Independence Struggle and the Creation of Tanzania
The politics of decolonization in both Zanzibar and the mainland turned the racial
hierarchy on its head, but in very different ways. In both cases, the introduction of
electoral politics and the logic of numbers radically altered the dynamics of identity. In
mainland Tanzania, the politics of independence brought to power a leadership
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committed to inclusive concepts of nationhood. In Zanzibar, upending the racial
hierarchy meant a bloody revolution and the unanticipated incorporation into Tanzania.
On the mainland, the initial British strategy for Tanganyikan self-government was
erected upon a preposterous philosophy of racial partnership imported from southern
Africa. The polity, in this bizarre vision, was essentially composed of three racial
segments, European, Asian, and African. Thus conceptualized, the notion of
“partnership” implied equal standing for each racial segment, in spite of numerical
proportions of 1:4:430. Naturally this formulation was unacceptable to the African
majority, which insisted on a principle of representation grounded in an equal weighting
of each individual. Peaceful and rapid decolonization, to which British policy everywhere
in Africa was committed by 1960, ultimately required that the British abandon the mantra
of racial partnership. Before they had done so, however, political mobilization
crystallized around the imperative of African solidarity to fend off British schemes to
entrench a preponderant voice for immigrant racial communities.
Two competing visions of the nation to be created existed in the period
immediately before independence. The dominant perspective, articulated by future
President Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU),2 offered
in place of racial partnership nonracial citizenship to those European and Asian residents
desiring to remain. The more radical Africanist view held that only the indigenous
population could claim rights. The new state thus should belong exclusively to its original
inhabitants.
Accordingly, political discourse revolved around race as prime identity category
in the competitive elections leading to independence; religious difference played little
role. A wide range of ethnic associations had appeared when colonial restrictions on
African organization eased in the 1950s. Initially these were welcomed by TANU as
party building blocks. In the final phases of independence struggle, however, party
ideology sanctified the territorial nation, whose unification and integration was a sacred
vocation. Racial division would end with the absorption of the small European and Indian
minorities as equal individual citizens, with some visible representation in the structures
of rule. Religious division was confined to the sphere of worship, and ethnicity was
relegated to the margins of private affiliation. The state, and its associated public realm,
were purely national space.
2 The Tanganyika African National Union was later renamed Chama cha Mapinduzi, or
“revolutionary party’’ (CCM).
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In Zanzibar, the ascendant Arab minority and ruling dynasty had British support,
in their attempts to adapt to the rules of access to self-government: creating representative
institutions on the basis of a universal franchise. The earlier soft language of deferential
acceptance of British overrule was replaced by a militant discourse of assertive
nationalism. The discursive strategy of the Arab ruling elite—to deploy the language of
liberation in militant form to channel independence aspirations of less favored racial
strata in support of the postcolonial preservation of existing status hierarchies—did
succeed through the moment of power transfer in 1963. However, in January 1964 a
racial uprising swept away the old system.
Led by Ugandan John Okello, a tiny band of African insurgents overthrew the
Arab regime and unleashed a wave of racial vengeance striking at Arabs and Indians.
Some 500 people were killed, and heavy property damage was inflicted upon Arabs and
Indians. Some 80 percent of the Indians fled Zanzibar, along with 20 percent of the
Arabs. Arab identity suddenly became a dangerous liability rather than a badge of social
privilege.
The threat of sustained racial violence and its spillover effects, the disconcerting
risks of great power involvement, and fears of chaos led Tanzanian President Nyerere and
a small coterie of Zanzibar African politicians furtively to negotiate the immediate
incorporation of the islands into mainland Tanganyika, rebaptised Tanzania. However,
Zanzibar was accorded broad autonomy and disproportionate representation in Tanzanian
central institutions, concessions that would become a source of repeated friction in the
years ahead. Nonetheless, the amalgamation survived and permanently altered the
parameters of identity within the newly reconfigured state.
Nyerere and Nation-building
In the Nyerere period (1961-1985), nation-building was a cornerstone of policy.
The key vehicles for achieving this supreme purpose were TANU/CCM as a single party,
African socialism as a unifying creed, Swahili as the sole national language, and the
ascendant personality of Nyerere as “mwalimu” (teacher) of nationhood. The
effectiveness of this package of instruments is beyond doubt with respect to the
mainland; Zanzibar, however, has remained a distinct entity, and only partly shares the
affective attachment to Tanzanian nationhood.
The single party system in its Tanzanian version (extended to Zanzibar in 1977)
enjoyed a much more sustained legitimacy than did most of its African counterparts. The
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vitality of the ruling party was reasonably preserved for more than two decades by a
Tanzanian innovation (subsequently copied by some other single parties) of permitting a
party-structured and limited competition for seats in the national legislature. Two party-
screened candidates competed in each constituency, resulting in the frequent defeat of
incumbents. The autocratic inner essence of party operation was also mitigated by the
prolonged appeal of its ideology of populist socialism and a higher order of engagement
in its precepts by national leaders, especially Nyerere himself, than was typical of
socialist orientation in Africa. In the end, Tanzanian socialism failed to deliver economic
uplift, and indeed the doctrinal rigidity of Nyerere so long delayed an inevitable
liberalization that the economic dislocations of his utopian blueprint became severe by
his retirement in 1985. His economic miscalculations notwithstanding, Nyerere remained
a revered leader, whose death at the turn of the century unleashed an overwhelming wave
of popular grief. He retained an austere and populist style, and was never suspected of
gross corruption, unlike many of his fellow rulers.
Nyerere continued his battle to contain ethnicity to the end. The ruling organs of
state and party reflected a careful regional balance, and state agents were customarily
posted outside their region of origin. No more serious charge could confront a minister
than “tribalism,” or ethnic nepotism. Ethnic terms were banned in the media and in
electoral speeches, and ethnic associations dissolved.
Swahili was a crucial instrument of cultural statecraft. By the independence years,
well over 90 percent of Tanzanians could use Swahili. The language was required for all
government and national businesses whenever possible. English remained as a language
of international contact, but Tanzania went much further than most African states in
elevating an indigenous lingua franca as the dominant language in most domains. Among
younger generations, Swahili begins to become a first language. A plaintive voice is
sometimes raised warning that indigenous languages are threatened with extinction. But
if national integration is perceived as the supreme mission, Swahili must be recognized as
a potent instrument of social unification.
The over-sized and under-performing state that resulted from Tanzania’s socialist
orientation eventually undermined Nyerere’ s egalitarian visions. Indeed, even before
populist socialism was officially abandoned in 1985, it had been eaten away from within
by the transfer of popular energies to parallel markets and the informal sector. But among
the many critics of government policies by the 1980s, one rarely heard ethnic language
used to denounce their shortcomings.
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The one community that believed itself targeted by Tanzanian socialism was the
Asian. A 1971 act virtually nationalizing urban real property hit Asians especially hard.
Within three months, half the Asian population had emigrated. The systematic hostility to
private endeavor that characterized populist socialism, although not racially motivated,
did have an unmistakable racial target, since Asian enterprise predominated in the private
sector.
Liberalization and Its Impact
Since 1985, Tanzania has moved towards both political and economic
liberalization. There is little doubt that reform in both domains was indispensable.
However, some new kinds of communal tensions have appeared. Asians, who had been
the principal victims of socialist orientation, are the primary beneficiaries of market
capitalism, bringing resentment about Asian commercial practices and commitment to
Tanzania to the surface. Muslim grievances claiming serious under-representation at the
administrative summit come into the open. Muslim intellectuals charge Nyerere and the
CCM with imposing a Christian concept of the state, marginalizing Muslims, and erasing
their central contribution to the anticolonial struggle.3 The status of Zanzibar is another
source of discord, with its perceived excessive representation in central organs and (for
Christians) its Islamic external connections. Zanzibar is also seen as an international
embarrassment for its political repression. The competitive elections in 1995 and 2000
were generally well conducted on the mainland, but were marked by serious thuggery and
violence on the islands. Conversely, one may note that communal tensions on Zanzibar
are barely contained within the shared state; were Zanzibar to split away, the potential for
violent confrontation among identity groups on the islands would be high.
In Tanzania, the liberalized political order strives to avert the prominence of
ethnicity in politics by prohibiting party organization on the basis of ethnic, religious, or
racial identity. Some argue that this proscription unduly circumscribes democratic choice.
However, most Tanzanians appear to support this restriction, and wish party competition
to retain its national orientation, structured by policy choice.
Ethnicity is more openly expressed in contemporary Tanzania than during the
single party era, but there is little sign that it is in the process of intensive politicization.
3 Mohamed Said, The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924-1968) (London: Minerva,
1998). Sykes was really the creator of the Tanganyika African Association, according to Said, and a crucial
figure in its transformation into TANU in 1954; however, the CCM official party history does not even
mention him.
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The national ethos instilled in the Nyerere era is robust, and not in question. The upsurge
in expressions of racial and religious conflict and even antagonism remain within
manageable limits.
The forms taken by ethnicity in Tanzania, then, must be understood in the context
of the particular historical trajectory of that polity. The dramatically divergent pathways
of ethnic politics in the neighboring states of Uganda and Kenya, also under largely
similar patterns of British rule, illustrate the importance of the sequence of different
experiences of identity formation, and the significance of path dependency. Constrained
by the parameters established by the previous epoch, each of the successive historical
moments created a distinctive set of arrangements, which in turn limited the range of
possible outcomes in the succeeding period. In larger historical terms, I would suggest
that the long Nyerere reign was especially influential. Ethnicity was not erased, and is
becoming more public. Yet this trend occurs within a framework of deeply instilled
consensus on a Tanzanian nation, within which ethnic patterns of identity may find
expression without aggressive manifestations. Ethnicity in Tanzania, in its instrumentalist
form, operates in subdued fashion. This in turn will influence the unfolding dynamics of
its future constructions.
Chapter 3
Uganda: Ethnicity and the Problematic of State Revival
To reduce it to its crudest form, the pull of the tribal force does not accept
Uganda as one country, does not accept the people of Uganda as
belonging to one country, does not accept the National Assembly as a
national institution but as an assembly of peace conference delegates and
tribal diplomatic and legislative functionaries, and looks at the
Government of Uganda as a body of umpires or referees in some curious
game of “Tribal Development Monopoly.”
—former President A. Milton Obote (cited in Kasfir 1976: 209)
Being a tribalist to me means undue, hopeless, and morbid loyalty and
allegiance to one’s tribe. It must be emphasized that I am not against tribes
but rather against tribalism.
—former President Idi Amin (cited in Turyakihayo-Rugyema 1998: 131)
A leader should show the people that those who emphasize ethnicity are
messengers of perpetual backwardness. This process of undermining a
sectarian mentality of “my tribe, my religion” is linked with the process of
modernization and overcoming underdevelopment.... Eventually, the
society will be transformed and modernized. The moment that process
takes place, one’s tribe or religion cease to be of much consequence.
-President Yoweri Museveni (1997: 189)
The Different Itinerary of Uganda
Uganda provides a very different and more complex illustration of the politics of
ethnicity in Africa. Although its colonial era was relatively tranquil, the structure of
British rule placed ethnicity far more squarely in the center of the political equation than
in Tanzania. Christian evangelization was intensely competitive and its linkage to
Buganda political warfare at the beginning of the colonial era deeply embedded a
religious line of cleavage. The pact by which decolonization took place proved fragile,
and political instability led to the catastrophic Idi Amin tyranny from 1971 to 1979,
followed by a failed transition with several more years of horrendous violence. Only in
1986 did a new era of relative stability begin, which is now visibly fraying at the edges as
illustrated by the disconcerting level of violence and flawed conduct of the 2001 elections
(see Young 1976, 216-73; Young, Forthcoming). Furthermore, stabilization in the core
regions of Uganda is not matched by tranquility around its periphery; insurgent militias in
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northern and western Uganda, operating across the Sudan and Congo-Kinshasa border,
bring endemic insecurity in these zones, and the acquisition of automatic weapons by
more than 30,000 warriors in the northeastern zone of Karamoja makes the long-standing
practice of cattle-raiding far more lethal (see Mirzeler and Young 2000).
Race as Vanishing Factor
The politics of ethnicity in Uganda are intertwined with historic cleavages of race
and religion, which require a brief discussion before we turn to the ethnic realm. Colonial
Uganda, like Tanzania, functioned on the basis of a clear racial hierarchy: Europeans
ruled, Asians traded, and Africans farmed. However, European settlement was only
briefly encouraged, and at the time of independence there were only 10,000 resident
Europeans, mostly officials, missionaries, or business and other professionals, few of
whom regarded themselves as permanently rooted. Although the tiny European minority
enjoyed significant influence in colonial politics, this rapidly vanished in the 1950s.
The Asian presence was more consequential after independence. By 1970, Asians
in Uganda numbered 83,000, of whom 43,000 had citizenship status and most others
intended long-term residence. Their hopes for some form of “racial partnership” in
government were extinguished in late colonial politics, but some prosperous Asian
business figures played an important part in financing political parties as a means of
purchasing security. Their dominance in rural trade and urban business engendered strong
antagonisms among Africans. In the last years of the first Obote regime (1962-1971), a
leftward drift, especially rhetorical, created nervous reactions among the Asian
community. However, few anticipated that military despot Idi Amin, claiming that a
dream had instructed him that “the Asian problem was becoming extremely explosive
and that God was directing me to act immediately to save the situation,” would follow
this divine inspiration by the sudden expulsion of the Asian minority (cited in Mittelman
1975: 229). This racial cleansing eliminated all but 10,000 Asians from Uganda and was
accompanied by the confiscation of an estimated $1 billion in property. Under President
Museveni, an invitation was extended to former Ugandan Asians to return, with the
promise of return of seized property; a modest number responded to this opportunity, but
few now regarded themselves as a permanent segment of the citizenry as before. Thus
racial division as a politically important communal cleavage, very significant in the late
colonial period and into the first independence years, had largely disappeared.
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Origins of Religious Divisions
Religious divisions were more enduring, however, although sectarian politics
have been less salient under President Museveni since 1986. But the particular patterns of
colonial evangelization implanted a deep consciousness of religious division, which
became powerfully politicized in the 1950s. Uganda stands out in Africa for the political
importance of sectarian divisions, interfacing in complex ways with ethnic politics.
World religions first appeared in Uganda in the 1860s and 1870s, initially at the
court of the Buganda monarch (or kabaka), Mutesa I. 1 Muslim merchants from Zanzibar
were first to arrive, followed by Catholic and Protestant emissaries tied to France and
Britain respectively. Mutesa expressed great curiosity about these novel theologies,
attracted in good part by their potential use as ideological ramparts to strengthen his
kingship. He carefully restricted proselytization to the royal court itself. However, this
limitation still offered access to the crucial future elite—hundreds of royal pages, placed
in the court as candidates for subsequent appointment in the service of the Kabaka.
The Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim factions that emerged at the court then gave
ideological shape to the complex Buganda civil wars, which raged from 1886 until the
establishment of British rule (in alliance with a Protestant Ganda faction) in 1893. The
colonial settlement under British tutelage created a form of religious consociationalism;
the chiefly posts in the twenty Buganda counties were divided up in terms of the relative
political strength of the three factions; Protestants were allocated ten, Catholics eight, and
Muslims two chieftaincies. A substantial population movement occurred to align
settlement patterns with the religious partition.
Buganda then became the epicenter of Christian evangelization, with Ganda
catechists playing a key role. Massive conversion took place in Buganda in the 1890s,
spreading more slowly to other regions. The Anglican Church Missionary Society
benefited from the informal patronage of the colonial state, but the two main Catholic
orders—French White Fathers in the west, Italian Verona Fathers in the north—competed
energetically.
Islam spread much more slowly, from three nodal points. The two Muslim
chieftaincies in Buganda were one such base of diffusion. Kakungulu, a Muslim Ganda
general who subdued much of eastern Uganda on behalf of the British, formed a second
1 A brief note on terminology may be useful here. The Ganda people called their territory
Buganda, “the land of the Ganda,” and their kingdom was referred to as the Buganda kingdom. The British
colony, which included many other peoples in addition to the Ganda, was named Uganda.
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cluster around his final settlement near Mbale. A third embryo of Islam took root in the
northwest, originating in a “Sudanese” detachment of the Egyptian army expanding into
Uganda in the 1870s. Cut off by the Mahdist rebellion in Sudan in 1885, they were
eventually recruited as colonial auxiliaries. Of mixed, mainly southern Sudanese origin,
they had adopted the Islamic religion of their mostly Egyptian officers. Lacking the
leadership of religious specialists, their Islamic practice was perhaps rudimentary, but the
religious identity was implanted. Idi Amin traced his ancestry to this group, which
acquired the ethnic label of “Nubian” within Uganda.
At the time of independence, Catholics appeared to have a numerical majority,
and Muslims were only about 5 percent; by this time the great majority of the population
observed one of the universal religions. Protestants, however, enjoyed colonial favor in
chiefly appointments and other forms of preference, a source of deepening resentment by
Catholics. Far more than in Tanzania, the sectarian scramble for converts had been
intensely competitive. By the 1950s, Uganda had a numerous elite imbued with sectarian
attachments, a large contingent of African teachers socialized to religious loyalty, and a
solidly developed indigenous clergy. For the great majority of the citizenry, religious
affiliation was a core element in the repertory of identities.
Independence and Sectarian Party Divisions
Political space opened for parties in the 1950s, with the religious line of division
crucial in determining alignments. Catholics and Muslims harbored an acute sense of
sectarian injustice arising from religious nepotism of the mostly Protestant chiefs in such
issues as land, taxation, and the administration of justice. To add insult to injury, the first
political parties to emerge were perceived to have Protestant leadership. The law of
numbers that electoral politics would introduce provided an irresistible incentive to
Catholics to organize in response; in 1956 the Democratic Party (DP) was launched with
firm support from the Catholic hierarchy. The first competitive elections that took place
in nine of the then twelve districts in 1958 were marked by ferocious religious rivalry.
Despite active Catholic mobilization, Protestant candidates won seven of the ten
legislative seats at issue.
The winning candidates formed a new party, the Uganda Peoples Congress
(UPC), with a distinctly Protestant hue, though less direct church involvement. The UPC
also reflected resentments in other districts at Buganda pretensions to special status.
Throughout the country, there was a degree of antagonism to Buganda, seen as
economically and socially advantaged by colonial policy, and now demanding autonomy.
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Two more elections occurred before independence, in 1961 and 1962. The
sectarian dialectic unleashed by the electoral process then intertwined with two other
critical dimensions of late colonial politics: their enclosure within the ethnic districts, and
the polarity of Buganda versus the rest. The competition between the Uganda Peoples
Congress and the Democratic Party pitted candidates of the same ethnic group against
each other; thus their political contest tended to follow religious lines. The 1961 election
took place at a moment when Buganda was indignantly resisting a proposed constitution
of a unitary nature; the kingdom establishment ordered a boycott of the election, observed
by all but 3 percent of the electorate. The DP won an apparent victory, rendered fragile
by a parliamentary majority that was dependent on its Buganda contingent, who had been
elected by a tiny minority of the electorate. DP leader, the Ganda Catholic Benedicto
Kiwanuka, was installed as provisional premier, to the burning anger of Buganda. The
mood is captured by the late Kabaka Mutesa II in his autobiography, who wrote that the
DP “gained lasting hatred. They were seen as traitors to Buganda, trying to grab office at
the expense of loyalty” (Kabaka 1967: 158-59).
The British could not transfer power to a government of such debatable
legitimacy and thus insisted on new independence elections in 1962, with a semi-federal
constitution giving partial satisfaction to the demands for Buganda autonomy. The royal
establishment in Buganda launched a monarchist party (Kabaka Yekka, or “the king
alone,” KY) to counter the Catholic imprint of the DP and the anti-Ganda sentiments of
the UPC. The UPC won 33 seats, the DP 22, and KY took all 22 Buganda seats. The deep
animosity towards the DP outweighed the Buganda suspicions of the hidden agendas of
the UPC, and thus KY joined an uneasy coalition with the UPC to permit accession to
independence.
One must underline the critical role that sectarian division played in the actual
conduct of the electoral campaigns. As noted above, the competition between UPC and
DP took place within the ethnic districts; thus the contenders, usually of the same ethnic
background, were differentiated in the eyes of many voters especially by their religious
attachments. This pattern was reinforced by the intensity of UPC-DP struggles for
political control for local government of the ethnic districts, which also had heavy
sectarian overtones. These competitive dynamics further embedded religious identity in
the political consciousness of the electorate.
The UPC gradually tightened its hold on power through the 1960s, inducing
carpet crossings by growing numbers of DP and KY parliamentarians, the military
occupation of Buganda in 1966, and the banning the DP by 1969. By the end of the
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decade, a virtual single party system was in operation. The significance of religious
identity as a defining element in politics was by no means erased at this point; even after
the decade of Idi Amin’s tyrannical rule during the 1970s, the DP and UPC instantly
sprang back to life, although perhaps with their sectarian clienteles diluted.
During the years of lethal Amin rule, Islam enjoyed a moment of official favor for
the first time since colonial occupation began. Amin enforced a unification of Muslim
leadership and attracted significant resources for the flourishing of Islam, especially from
Libya and Saudi Arabia. Islam, however, had limited numbers of followers and even
fewer among the intellectual elite. In spite of divine inspiration to Islamicize Uganda
purportedly received during a miraculous thunderstorm at Mecca while he was making
the haj (or pilgrimage), Amin had only a modest impact on religious demography: by the
1990s, the Muslim population of Uganda had only grown to 10 percent. The most
important new element was access to material support from the world Islamic community
for mosque construction, overseas training in Islamic theology, the subsequent creation of
an Islamic university in Mbale, and expanded opportunities for performing the haj.
The years of terror under Amin did not weaken the Christian churches, despite the
assassination of leading clerics. The progressive dereliction of the state by default thrust
responsibility for survival of the educational system and such social services as could
continue back upon religious congregations. But the traumatizing effect of the Amin
tyranny, whose victims may have totaled 500,000, probably did diminish the saliency of
sectarian divisions. The DP, argues a Ugandan scholar, had become “truly national and
cut across regional, religious, ethnic and other boundaries” (Mutibwa 1992: 144).
The political experiences since the fall of Amin in 1979 appear to have further
reduced somewhat the centrality of the sectarian division. Obote’s return to power in a
1980 election widely regarded as rigged was soon undermined by a burgeoning set of
armed revolts, mostly centered in Buganda; these coalesced into the National Resistance
Army (NRA) led by Museveni. The bitter struggle cost 300,000 lives and was carried out
by insurgents whose recruitment crossed sectarian lines. The war raged mostly in
Buganda, though many of the fighters were westerners and 20 percent were Rwandan
Tutsi refugees.
The National Resistance Movement (NRM) in power since 1986 staked its claim
to legitimacy on inclusiveness and the rejection of identity-based divisions. Over time,
the Movement became increasingly viewed as dominated by westerners but has largely
escaped charges of sectarian orientation, though Museveni is of Protestant background. In
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both the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections, his principal opponents (Paul Ssemogerere
and Kizzi Besigye) were Catholics, but the religious cleavage did not visibly shape the
discourse of electoral combat. The dynamics of Protestant identity have become more
diverse and diffuse in recent years, as the Anglican Church of Uganda has lost ground to
flourishing evangelical and pentecostal sects. Within the Islamic community, a radical
Tabliq movement has emerged with an appeal to marginalized urban youth, although it
lacks any evident overlap with ethnic identity.
Thus new layers of identity-shaping historical experience appear to have partially
effaced the political importance of religious cleavage. Protestant ascendancy in local
institutions is no longer evident, as the colonial chiefs have given way to five tiers of
elected councils. The primary line of political division opposes Movement supporters and
supporters of multipartyism, the latter uniting DP and UPC partisans. New patterns of
regional tension and the nature of NRM-era politics serve to subdue and push into the
background the memories of the bitter sectarian struggles of the 1950s and 1960s.
Buganda as the Pivot of Ethnic Politics
As the patterns of religious division originated in Buganda, so also did the nature
of ethnic politics. British construction of a colonial realm began in Buganda, silently
absorbed in the personality of the state through the projection of its name upon the entire
territory (U/Ganda, with the Swahili form of the prefix, literally means “country of the
Ganda”). The colonial occupation was consolidated through the British creation of an
alliance with the political, religious, and military elite of Buganda, who then served as
crucial allies in extending political rule over the rest of the territory. Until the 1920s,
Ganda chiefs were appointed in many non-Ganda areas to create “native administration,”
and Ganda catechists did the legwork of Christian evangelization throughout the colony.
Buganda constituted a pole of reference for the crystallization of ethnic consciousness
elsewhere. On the negative side, Ganda privilege and perceived partnership with the
colonizer bred envy and animosity; on the positive side, the high status enjoyed by
Buganda was a model for emulation.
On the eve of the colonial partition, Buganda was an expanding, predatory state
absorbing flows of captured populations and new territories. The kingdom was unusually
integrated, centered upon its monarchical institution, a powerful reservoir of shared
symbols, and an historical narrative tracing kingship back many generations to a
mythological founder named Kintu. The first European visitors left flattering portraits of
the sophisticated structures of the kingdom and the intellectual curiosities of its king. The
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American explorer Henry Stanley, a master craftsman of ethnic stereotypes, wrote that
the Ganda were “an extraordinary people, as different from the barbarous pirates of
Uvuma, and the wild, mop-headed men of Eastern Usukame, as the British in India are
from their Afridi fellow-subjects, or the white Americans of Arkansas from the semi-
civilized Choctaws.” Kabaka Mutesa I, he added, was “an intelligent and distinguished
prince, who, if aided in time by virtuous philanthropists, will do more for Central Africa
than fifty years of Gospel teaching unaided by such authority, can do” (Stanley 1878:
225).
A critical factor in the consolidation of a Ganda historical narrative and its
inscription in the popular consciousness was the early emergence of a literate Christian
elite at the beginning of the colonial occupation. The Protestant faction, which assumed a
leading role in alliance with the British, included some remarkable cultural architects, in
particular Sir Apolo Kagwa and Ham Mukasa. Kagwa composed a court history at the
beginning of the twentieth century, including a king list stretching back to Kintu, which
became a foundational text for all subsequent histories. Its influence as a bible of identity
is impossible to exaggerate; nearly a century later, Wrigley notes, copies of the Kagwa
history of the kings can be found in most villages (Wrigley 1996: 8). Mukasa published a
collection of proverbs attesting to the invincibility, strength, and terrifying power of the
kabaka, the Ganda king.
The mystique of the omnipotent king as paragon for the kingdom translated into a
sense of Buganda’s historical superiority. In the words of Kabaka Mutesa II, “we were
accepted as the most civilized and powerful of the kingdoms.... It was through the
qualities of Baganda that Europeans were attracted to the country, hurrying through
Kenya and Tanzania to reach the ‘pearl of Africa,’ as Stanley called Buganda” (Kabaka
1967: 78-79). A Ganda scholar recounted childhood memories, from a period in
1953-1955 when the kabaka had been deported to Britain for refusal to cooperate with
London plans for decolonization, that “it was common gossip in my home and school
areas that while in exile the Kabaka was seduced by Queen Elizabeth II but had refused
her” (Gukiina 1972: 99). Embedded in this salacious anecdote is the implicit assertion of
Buganda equality with Britain, and a more submerged corollary that other Uganda groups
fell short.
Another crucial milestone in the construction of Buganda ethnonationalism was
the 1900 agreement with the colonizer, which codified a colonial settlement between
Buganda and Britain. In the Ganda historical imagination, this accord inscribed an
equality of status between the signatories; Kabaka Mutesa II would later write that, “The
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integrity and superiority of Buganda was fully recognized” in this treaty (Kabaka 1967:
64). The accord included a land settlement that also entered the register of Ganda
identity. This unique system, which originated with a grant of land title to 8,000 square
miles to 3,700 princes, chiefs, and courtiers (“mailo land” referring to the square mile
allotments, mailos, which have been much subdivided since), became transformed into a
defining attribute of Buganda.
Language was another pillar of identity. Together the early missionaries and the
Ganda Christian elite produced a written standard for Luganda (the language of the
Ganda), which became the initial vehicle for education, local administration, and
evangelization throughout southern Uganda. A substantial vernacular press and literature
soon followed, a storehouse of cultural expression enjoyed by no other Ugandan
language.
Geographically, politically, and economically, Buganda was the pivot of colonial
Uganda. The central institutions of the territory were situated in the heart of Buganda.
The core of the colonial economy was located in Buganda, where cash cropping of cotton
and coffee first began. The social infrastructure grew outwards from Buganda, which
through the colonial period had by far the densest educational infrastructure, and the first
generation elites were overwhelmingly Ganda, although Buganda contained only a
quarter of the total population.
Other Ethnic Discourses
Elsewhere in Uganda, at the time of colonial occupation, the ethnic identities that
later assumed political importance were much less clearly formed. One other major
kingdom, Bunyoro, existed, imparting a collective consciousness to its subjects. Bunyoro
resisted colonial occupation, however; Buganda encroachment on Bunyoro, a pattern of
precolonial politics, found support from its British allies. Nyoro identity, feeding on a
brooding resentment at the favor enjoyed by Buganda (and at their own lost territories),
drew on important resources of historical glory but lacked the reinforcement of cultural
entrepreneurs such as the Ganda Christian elite.
In other regions, the administrative organization imposed by the colonizer, shaped
by the British reading of ethnicity, played a crucial formative role. Based on districts
shaped around and named for ethnic groups, this framework of governance seeped into
the social consciousness, and meaningful self-awareness crystallized around the
nomenclature of territorial subdivision. Administrators and missionaries penned ethnic
UGANDA: ETHNICITY AND THE PROBLEMATIC OF STATE REVIVAL 53
monographs, which conferred the inestimable dignity of the printed word on what were
often novel forms of consciousness. The summary by Joan Vincent of the crystallization
of a Teso collective identity could be transposed to most other groups:
It was clear that a Teso awareness, as opposed to ongoing social
interactions between culturally related groups, came about only with the
establishment of British overrule, and so one may profitably inquire into
how this awareness was created. There were many centralizing
procedures. During the first twenty years, boundaries were constantly
changed until linguistic homogeneity was achieved and the Ngoratok
dialect recognized as that of the District, this vernacular being used in
schools. Statutory distinctions were made between the “natives of the
district” and “settlers”; exchange of cattle bridewealth was required of all
natives of the district apart from Muslims; cotton growing was made
compulsory regardless of primary occupations of different ethnic groups;
District by-laws were molded upon Teso tribal customs relating to Clan
elders, witchcraft accusation, the adoption of children.... The culmination
came with an effort to provide Teso with a symbolic figurehead like that
of the western kingdoms (Vincent 1971: 259).2
In the first years of independence, a larger regional identity transcript was
superimposed over ethnicity itself, a transcript that empasized south versus north, often
characterized as “Bantu” versus “Nilotic.” The southern groups were part of the huge
Bantu family of languages, and readily accepted Luganda as lingua franca; however,
“Bantu” corresponded to no historical frame of identity. In the north, a couple of major
language families were represented. The “Nilotic” reference strictly speaking applied
only to those groups with a loose affinity to a Luo dispersion myth (including Acholi,
Padhola, Alur, Lango, Labwor). But there was in reality little operative sense of shared
community, even of momentary political convenience, apart from a common resentment
towards Buganda in particular.
Set against this background, the structure of ethnic politics in late colonial
Uganda seems pre-ordained, though complicated by the religious factor which cut across
the ethnic affiliations. The first nationalist political parties were led by Ganda. At the
same time, the royal establishment sought to preserve the special status of Buganda in
any independence settlement. Leading an all-Ugandan anticolonial nationalism was
evidently incompatible with claiming a special autonomous status for the Ganda
kingdom. Ganda claims catalyzed the emergence of an anti-Ganda coalition, the UPC,
2 The British administrator who codified the Teso identity and tradition was J.C.D. Lawrence; see
Lawrence 1957 for his account.
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which as noted above also had a Protestant coloration. Since the Buganda establishment
was Protestant, the DP could mobilize some Catholic Ganda support in implicit
opposition to the Protestant court elite, as well as a national following mobilizing
Catholics from other regions.
The First Obote Regime
Buganda restiveness was marked on the eve of independence. The law of numbers
in democratic representation made it impossible to preserve the ascendant role the
kingdom had enjoyed in colonial times. For this reason, the kingdom elite insisted on
federal autonomy in the independence settlement, and even momentarily declared its own
independence in December 1961, though without taking any steps to give effect to that
threat. To prevent absorption into the national political parties and the rallying of
Catholic Ganda to the DP, a separate Ganda party was formed around the symbols of the
monarchy for the independence elections of 1962, the Kabaka Yekka or KY. The potency
of the appeal to ethnic solidarity, invoking the threat to kingdom integrity posed by the
national parties, assured a KY sweep of the Buganda seats. As noted earlier, outside of
Buganda, the 1962 election was essentially a district-by-district battle fought largely
along the sectarian line of division, rather than invoking ethnicity per se. The election
results created a situation where no party had a parliamentary majority; the UPC and KY
detested the DP more than they distrusted each other, so independence was achieved with
a UPC-KY coalition. Buganda retained a symbolic primacy with the award of the
ceremonial presidency of Uganda to the Kabaka, while UPC leader Milton Obote, a
Lango from the north, became prime minister. To secure consensus on the independence
constitution, a lesser semi-federal status had to be conceded to the three western
kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole, and Toro, and the district of Busoga.
Obote, however, shared the doctrinal commitment to the ideal of a unitary nation
that animated most African leaders of the independence generation. He set about
inducing the defection of DP and even some KY members of parliament, achieving a
majority without KY by the middle 1960s. A new line of fracture then appeared, along
north/south regional lines within the UPC, translated in popular discourse as “Nilotic”
versus “Bantu”. The shadowy alliances that took form loosely overlapped a division
between more radical intellectuals and those of more moderate disposition, a contrast in
political sensibilities that found some sociological rationales in the relative
underdevelopment of the north as opposed to the greater prosperity of the south.
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The factional struggle burst into the open in 1966, when Obote struck a
preemptive blow by arresting five “Bantu” ministers accused of plotting his ouster
through parliamentary means. He suspended the constitution, removed the kabaka from
the presidency, and assumed full executive powers. In response, Buganda issued an
abortive declaration of secession; Obote responded by ordering the army to seize the
royal palace, depose the kabaka, dissolve the kingdom, and occupy Buganda. This fateful
decision sealed in blood Buganda’ s unyielding and bitter antipathy to Obote, and made
the army the arbiter of power. In turn, the ethnic composition of the security forces
became pivotal to politics. In the final years prior to his 1971 overthrow, Obote sought to
exclude ethnicity from politics by making the UPC a de facto one-party state and to win
popular support by a radicalization of Ugandan policy. The denial of public space to
cultural difference made ethnicity less visible, but the sullen, brooding defiance of
Buganda, a broader subliminal sentiment of “northern domination,” and the silent
discontent of the DP constitutency made Obote’ s position precarious and increasingly
dependent on the army.
After an initial period when the British relied upon the Nubian soldiers stranded
from the Egyptian army, Ganda auxiliaries, and some Indian troops to consolidate their
occupation, the small colonial army had shifted its recruitment to the north. A military
model developed in India was imported into many other British colonial territories, which
focused recruitment upon “martial races”—identified by their physical bearing, warlike
qualities, and reliable fidelity to the imperial estate. In the Uganda case, recruitment came
to privilege the Acholi. Though there is some dispute over the degree to which the
“martial race” theory applied in Uganda (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 32), some 50 percent of
the military personnel may have been Acholi by 1962. Other northerners, such as
Lugbara and Teso, were also fairly numerous in the military, while southerners were
relatively few.
Once the ruler comes to depend on the armed forces for survival, the logic of what
Cynthia Enloe terms “the ethnic security map” comes into play (Enloe 1980). The
political security of the regime is perceived as requiring control of the armed forces
through officers with ethnic affinity to the ruler. The 1966 Uganda crisis coincided with a
wave of military coups across the continent (Algeria, Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Central
African Republic, Congo-Kinshasa); thus Obote knew he was hostage to the personal
fidelity of the army, especially its top commanders. Accordingly the military command
structure required the painstaking application of an “ethnic security map.”
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Although Obote purged most southern officers or those with Buganda connections
from 1965 on, his ethnic security map proved to be flawed. Idi Amin, a northerner of
alternate Nubian and Kakwa identities, had been named commander. His loyalty was
solid in the move against Buganda, but by 1970 had become uncertain. Sensing Obote
was about to replace him, Amin struck first with a preemptive coup in January 1971.
Amin at once applied his own ethnic security map, massacring hundreds of Acholi and
Lango troops suspected of ethnic loyalty to Obote and purging the officer corps.
Subsequently, the bounds of Amin’s security narrowed to exclude the Lugbara as well
and to rely on the mass recruitment of Kakwa, Nubians, and those from related groups
across the Sudan and Congo-Kinshasa borders.
Amin’s Tyranny
The 1979 overthrow of Amin by the Tanzanian army in support of an Ugandan
exile militia led to the complete disbanding of the Amin army, a number of whose
fragments later reappeared with diverse militia. Obote returned to power in 1980 on the
basis of a rigged election and set about building a new army, this time based even more
explicitly on an ethnic principle. As Ugandan military historian Amii Omara-Otunnu
observed, the new Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) “highlights the ethnic-
based nature of all the forces in Uganda and the entrenchment of ethnic cleavages within
Ugandan politics.” The UNLA was “fairly homogeneous in terms of linguistic
affiliation—being largely from the [Luo]-speaking peoples” (Omara-Otunnu 1987: 158).
However, for Obote Luo solidarity was insufficient; he insisted on a commander, David
Oyite Ojok, from his own Lango community. When Ojok perished in a helicopter crash
in 1984, Obote sought to impose a junior Lango officer as commander, passing over
several more senior Acholi. This triggered a 1985 coup by Acholi officers, who in turn
were driven from power in January 1986 by the NRA of Museveni.
Once again regime change was accompanied by the dissolution of the existing
army and a new ethnic security map. Museveni, an Ankole, had built his insurgent army
from southern recruits, mostly Ankole and Ganda, as well as Rwandan Tutsi long
resident as exiles in Uganda. The top military command today, rebaptised as the Uganda
Peoples Defense Force (UPDF), has an inner Ankole core, and a predominantly southern,
especially southwestern, rank and file.
The Amin and second Obote regimes were times of terror for many Ugandans; an
estimated half-million people met violent death under Amin, and 300,000 under Obote.
The Amin tyranny was above all arbitrary and capricious, not especially marked by
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ethnic targeting. Under the second Obote regime, however, the bulk of the fatalities
occurred in the Luwero triangle northwest of the capital, Kampala, where NRA insurgent
action was concentrated. The victims were largely Ganda.
The searing memories of terror and violence, and the ethnic images they evoke,
became defining elements in shaping the communal perceptions of the present. Nubians
and Kakwa today pay a high price for their association with the brutalities of the Amin
years. The Acholi are victims of the Obote policy of assigning front-line duty in the
Luwero triangle mostly to Acholi soldiers, assigning to Acholiland a virtual collective
guilt in the eyes of the south. The associated trauma was well captured in a 1987 Easter
pastoral address by the late Catholic bishop of Acholiland, Mgr. Cipriano Kihangire:
Many joined the army with the hope of getting rich overnight, and were
used by unscrupulous political leaders who sent them to carry out
“operations” in areas of political unrest. These operations involved
atrocious acts of violence against innocent civilians, including children
and women, who were subjected to unspeakable mistreatment. A lot of
looting was done.... When the loot was brought home, parents and
relatives welcomed it in their homes, knowing that it was looted. Instead
of correcting their children and condemning their actions, many parents
had only praise for them... We can now see that these present sufferings
are the result of their own sin (quoted in Gersony 1997: 9).
The dissolution of existing military forces in 1979 and 1986 had severe
consequences for public security, as remnants of the dissolved armies sprang back to life
as militias. In Acholiland, a religiously inspired movement, the Holy Spirit Movement of
Alice Lakwena, emerged in the traumatized environment of the collapse of the Obote
army and formed its own militia, which marched on Kampala in 1987 and was stopped
only a few dozen kilometers from the capital. The Lakwena movement eventually
became the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), operating from Sudan. Its personnel were
mostly Acholi, often abducted children, but its religious character faded and it became a
plundering militia sowing terror in Acholiland itself. In the Karamoja region in northeast
Uganda, pastoral warriors were able to sack the well-stocked armories of the Amin
garrisons in 1979 when his army evaporated, injecting a large supply of AK-47s into
local patterns of cattle-raiding, both within Karamoja and against neighboring groups.
The far more lethal conflicts that emerged sharpened ethnic tensions with neighboring
communities such as the Acholi, Teso, and Gisu, and transformed the dynamics of
identity conflict within Karamoja.
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Museveni, the “Movement,” and Ethnicity
The texture of ethnic politics has changed in the Museveni years. The political
framework for his regime, based upon the National Resistance Movement or NRM,
differs from its predecessors. Like earlier proponents of single party systems, Museveni
claims that multiple political parties sow ethnic and religious discord. Instead of a party,
he offers a “Movement,” which claims to be an inclusive idea around which all Ugandan
citizens can unite, but not a party. The UPC and DP are permitted to exist, but not to
campaign or to organize political meetings; the same restriction applies to a Conservative
Party in Buganda occupying some of the same political space as the former KY.
The Museveni regime is the first postcolonial government to enjoy substantial
Ganda support. However, conflicts remain over the permissible extent of Buganda claims
to autonomy. Buganda remains eager to gain full restoration of the kingdom. Museveni
curried Ganda favor early on by permitting the return and formal coronation of Ronald
Mutebi as kabaka, a position that had remained vacant since the 1969 death in exile of
Mutesa II. However, Museveni resisted demands for the restoration of constitutional
federalism when a new basic law was completed in 1995. Kingship is permitted only as a
“cultural institution,” shorn of its claim to official power.
The Movement regime was broadly representative in its early years and enjoyed
genuine support for the more secure conditions it brought, and for the renewed economic
growth it achieved. However, over time a southern and especially western predominance
has become more visible. The north, especially Acholiland, feels neglected and
marginalized.
A final aspect of ethnic politics in Uganda deserves mention: the significance of
cross-border ethnic dynamics, and the interpenetration of conflicts. Southern Sudan
rebels in the 1960s found sympathy and support among neighboring groups in northern
Uganda. After insurrection reignited in 1983, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
(SPLA) again occasionally enjoyed facilities on the Uganda side. In turn, the Acholi-
dominated Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was armed and sheltered by Sudan, especially
after 1994. Beginning with the 1959 Hutu uprising in Rwanda, substantial numbers of
Tutsi refugees fled to Uganda in several waves; by 1980 these Tutsi refugees numbered
100,000, and as noted earlier played a key role in the NRA, occupying a number of top
command positions after the Museveni triumph. Anti-Tutsi sentiment flared up in 1982,
when 45,000 were driven back to a homeland that was very reluctant to receive them. By
1989 Museveni felt growing pressure to purge the army of its Tutsi officers; those
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affected, who had earlier counted on promises of naturalization as Ugandans, formed the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) to fight their way back to Rwanda. In 1996, another
insurgent militia appeared on the western frontier, the Allied Democratic Front (ADF).
Operating on both sides of the Congo-Kinshasa border in the Ruwenzori mountains, the
ADF is a bizarre assortment of Konjo dissidents along the border, Muslim Tabliqs from
the urban centers, Hutu rebels from Rwanda, and former Mobutu soldiers. The
depradations of the ADF, which has no apparent political program, became Museveni’s
official justification for the deployment of the UPDF in the Congo from 1996 on, first in
support of the Laurent Kabila ouster of Mobutu, later to overthrow Kabila himself when
he seemed unable or unwilling to oust the ADF from its Congo bases.
In comparison with Tanzania, ethnic and religious divisions have played a much
more central role in Ugandan politics. Whether one takes the instability prior to 1986 as a
cause or an effect of communal division, the degree to which fear and insecurity became
embedded in the popular consciousness and now informs historical memory has no
Tanzanian counterpart, except in Zanzibar. The militarization of ethnicity is another
significant difference between the two cases. The period of relative stability since 1986
has lowered the temperature of ethnic and sectarian rivalry, but the challenge of
accommodating cultural diversity remains.
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Chapter 4
Congo-Kinshasa:
Ethnicity Faces the Disappearing State
A Brother or a Friend
“Between a brother and a friend, the choice is clear.”
— former President Mobutu Sese Seko, 4 October 1973
President Mobutu in his 1973 address to the United Nations General Assembly
was referring in this phrase to his spectacular decision to rupture relations with Israel in
solidarity with Arab states, a decision that triggered a cascade of African nations’
severance of ties with Israel. 1 As a mere friend, Israel had to give way to solidarity
obligations for the Arab brother. However, the popular interpretation of this phrase in
Congo-Kinshasa was quite different: the president was seen as merely articulating a daily
practice of ethnic nepotism in the exercise of power.
Congo politics have indeed been marked by the distinction between brothers and
friends. However, how this occurs, and the social meanings attached, has evolved over
time. In the decades since the word “independence” was first used publicly in 1956, the
country has experienced a succession of political arrangements of dramatic contrast, each
of which has left a distinctive imprint on the character of ethnic politics. The colonial
state under Belgian rule was exceptionally dense in its occupation and forceful in the
assertion of its hegemony. “Bula Matari” (or “Crusher of Rocks”) was the everyday
popular term used to label the colonial state. From this point of departure, there was a
sudden deflation of state capacity that accompanied an aborted decolonization; then after
an extended interlude of restored central power in the first Mobutu decade, a slow, then
accelerating decomposition of public institutions. By the turn of the century, Congo lay in
four fragments with six African armies deployed in support of the contending factions. In
this itinerary, Congo experienced a number of distinctive political moments, during
which the configuration of ethnicity took on particular definitions.
1 The material in this chapter is drawn in part from Young and Turner 1985: 138-63. Although the
country was officially known as “Zaire” from 1971 to 1997, I use “Congo” throughout. With a different
spelling, the term “Kongo” refers to one of the major ethnic groups in the Congolese nation, one of the first
groups encountered by early European visitors.
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In contrast to Tanzania and Uganda, Congo stands out in terms of its sheer
geographical dimensions. With 900,000 square miles, Congo equals in size the United
States east of the Mississippi. Although Algeria and Sudan slightly exceed Congo in area,
substantial parts of their land surface are uninhabitable desert. All of Congo is well
watered and peopled; in this sense, it is by some distance the largest African state in its
social geography.
Although the sharpness of racial categories in colonial Congo was even more
pronounced than in the other cases, and the Belgians once imagined they could create a
Eurafrican state tied to Belgium on the basis of a European-African partnership, these
illusions were fading fast by the time African nationalism visibly emerged in 1956. The
instant Africanization of army and bureaucracy resulted from the flight of Belgian
officers and functionaries within days of independence following a mutiny of the
Congolese troops. In turn most Belgian settlers departed in the early 1960s. Although the
Belgian resident population was substantial (at around 100,000) on the eve of
independence, their swift exodus blurred the racial dimensions of late colonial politics.
In contrast to Uganda especially, religion never became an important factor
interacting with ethnicity. The colonial state threw its weight behind the Catholic
missions, with mostly Belgian personnel; Protestant missions, mostly British, American,
or Scandinavian, were merely tolerated. As a result, roughly 80 percent of the Christian
converts were Catholic. Unlike the East African instances, the colonial state and Catholic
missions actively combated Islam, largely succeeding in preventing expansion of the
small communities of converts around the Zanzibari slave-trading stations established in
the late nineteenth century. Although there was some degree of competition between
Catholic and Protestant missions, this did not become embedded in the popular
consciousness as it did in Uganda. Thus in Congo identity politics revolves essentially
around ethnicity.
Colonial Impact on Ethnicity
Ethnicity operates at multiple levels. Social understandings and the everyday
vocabulary of ethnicity in Congo revolve around a number of large, aggregate ethnic
labels: Kongo, Luba, Mongo, Lunda, Shi, and a substantial number of others. However,
the multiple layering insisted upon in Chapter 1 is well illustrated by a close examination
of these examples, each of which contains subordinate echelons of identity that have
sometimes been politically important. Hovering above the ethnic categories are broader
patterns of self-awareness defined by the five major lingua franca—Kikongo in western
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Congo; Lingala in Kinshasa, along the Congo river and in the north; Swahili in the
eastern third; Tshiluba in the south central region; and Lomongo in the central basin. At a
more local level are many smaller groups with some degree of recognition in
conventional classification schemes. The number of different ethnic groups is commonly
estimated at around 200. Any precise figure is inevitably misleading, for the reasons
given in the opening chapter. The distinction between a group and a sub-group is often
unclear, and the delimitation of a given ethnic field may be an arbitrary reduction of an
ambiguous reality. But the sheer geographic scale of the country inevitably adds to the
ethnic complexity of Congolese society.
The Belgian colonial state was formative in a number of respects, not only
through the influence of its own ethnic classifications, but also from the social geography
resulting from its hegemony. The location of major mission stations and educational
facilities, the emergent urban social nodes, the routes of migration that took shape, and
labor recruitment patterns all played their part. So also did the colonial stereotypes
attached to ethnic categories: hard-working or indolent, “open to civilization” or hostile
to the Belgian presence. The ethnic labels employed on identification cards and in census
categories fed back into the popular consciousness.
One may detect a trace of ethnic imperialism in some early ethnographic writings
by administrators or missionaries. The political concept of Mongohood really originates
in a massive two-volume work published in 1944 by a former provincial governor
(Vanderkerken 1944). A cluster of missionary-scholars based at the Sacred Heart station
at Mbandaka tirelessly promoted Mongo language and culture, sharing the expansive
views of Vanderkerken as to the geographic dimensions of Mongo country. A
comparably broad definition of a Luba zone was provided in a classic monograph by
former administrator Edmond Verhulpen (1936).
Ethnonationalist sensitivities in Belgium itself also had significant effects on
definitions of Congolese identity. In the final colonial decade, tensions between Walloon
and Flemings in Belgium sharpened, and spilled into colonial policy, a phenomenon
closely observed by the African elite. On the Catholic mission side, Flemings were
predominant. Of those who served as surrogate cultural entrepreneurs for Congolese
ethnic consciousness, such as the architects of Mongohood, a number were themselves
active Flemish nationalists.
In other instances colonial action favored the strengthening of sub-group
identities. In the lower Congo, different mission congregations created competing
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versions of Kikongo (the language of the Kongo people) based on the regional variant in
their zone of operation. These in turn both influenced the shape of local cleavages within
the Congo zone and made the unification of the Kongo language a major objective of
Kongo cultural politics. The drawing of provincial boundaries could also influence ethnic
categorizations; the Kasai-Kivu border split a zone of shared language and culture into
“Tetela” in Kasai Province and “Kusu” in Kivu Province.
First Political Moment: Urban Elections
The timing of the belated opening for African political action substantially
affected subsequent party organization. In contrast to Uganda, where voting first took
place within rural ethnic districts, the initial competitive elections in Congo took place in
seven major cities in 1957 and 1958. Political parties were not permitted, so the social
infrastructure of ethnic associations provided crucial organizational resources for the
candidates. The particular definition of each urban social field fixed in the public mind a
salient understanding of the key cleavages. Candidates in turn learned how invaluable
ethnic vote banks could prove. Thus ethnic politics in 1957 were perceived as “Kongo”
versus “Ngala” in Kinshasa, “Lulua” versus “Luba” in Kananga, “Mongo” versus
“Ngombe” in Mbandaka, or by regional labels of “Kasaian” versus “authentic Katangan”
in Lubumbashi. The logic of competition tended to reduce broader urban social fields to a
polar opposition between the two most visible, best organized, and numerous groupings.
The urban institutions had only a brief moment of high visibility before the
sudden acceleration of decolonization in 1959 shifted the center of political gravity to the
provincial and national level. However, this interlude was long enough to make apparent
the opportunities for rewarding ethnic clienteles that institutional control could provide.
The victors enjoyed the advantages of allocating urban lots and other favors. The lesson
was clear: ethnic mobilization was an imperative for self-defense.
The abrupt Belgian concession of immediate independence in January 1960
transformed the calculations and redefined the political arena. Elections for national and
provincial assemblies, which in turn would choose central and regional governments,
were scheduled for May 1960. Independence would follow in June. Now the stakes were
enormous and uncertainty was total; at issue were no longer parcels of city land but the
entire political system. Millennial hopes jostled with nightmarish fears.
The dramaturgy of the competitive election in circumstances of high
unpredictability and an environment of pronounced ethnic sensitivities, noted in Chapter
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1, permeated the popular imagination. Although political parties had begun to take form,
their constituencies were undefined, and their electoral potential was difficult to read at
the outset of the campaign. Political discourse operated at two levels. At the formal level,
the categories of anticolonial African nationalism were used, with varying degrees of
radicalism. The official political debate appeared to revolve about the degree of
animosity towards the Belgian rulers, and the choice between unitary or federal
institutions. However, a more subterranean language of identity and its ambiguous
demands suffused the campaign.
Second Political Moment: Independence Elections
The urban social fields of the municipal elections were a point of departure for
electoral organization, but the cities were numerically eclipsed by the 80 percent of the
voting public in rural areas and small towns. Some of the ethnic categories central to the
city elections had a rural hinterland that could be mobilized; others had relied upon
primarily urban classifications (like those of the Ngala in Kinshasa, or the Kasaians in
Lubumbashi) that were not readily translatable to rural areas. The ambiguity of a number
of ethnic categories was illuminated in this process, as was the uncertainty of their
relative proportions. Any number of political organizers trooped to consult
anthropologists at Lovanium University (now Kinshasa University) to seek expert
opinion on how large their groups were, and what the effective boundaries of their ethnic
zones might be.
The law of numbers imposed strategies more complex than simple appeal to a
given ethnic unit. In much of the country, the basic rural identity units were much too
small to command electoral weight alone. Thus the game required weaving together blocs
of votes through coalitions. In some cases, this might be accomplished by ethnic
stretching: expanding cultural identities to their outermost limits around such aggregated
entities as “Kongo” or “Mongo.” In other cases, it might suffice to build a regional
alliance of groups presumed to share an interest and some affinity.
These schemes enjoyed differential success. Kongo party organizers, for example,
were stunned to discover that groups they believed to belong to “their” cultural cluster
had voted for competing parties. Especially in the cities, the competitive impact of the
more radical, unitary Congolese nationalist message was important in the outcome, in
interaction with more localized themes. The party most analysts declared victorious in the
elections, the Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba (MNC-L), led by the
charismatic Patrice Lumumba, deployed a political language mirroring the themes of
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such luminous heroes of African independence as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana or Sekou
Toure of Guinea. Though its progressive ideology attracted radical intellectuals in urban
centers throughout the country, and the party was the only effective competitor on a
national scale, the MNC-L itself won only 33 of 137 seats in the national assembly
(though eight additional seats were won by closely allied parties). Closely inspected, the
Lumumba constituency had two main components: the large rural hinterland of
Kisangani, where Lumumba emerged as a leader, a city not polarized by the 1957
elections; and Lumumba’s own Tetela-Kusu ethnic homeland.
Following the elections, a tortuous compromise was reached just prior to
independence on 30 June 1960 by which Lumumba became prime minister, with Kongo
leader Joseph Kasavubu as president. Five days after independence, the army mutinied
and its entirely Belgian officer corps was removed. In the ensuing disorder, within a week
most Belgian administrators fled the country and the richest province, Katanga, seceded
with Belgian complicity. I will not follow in detail the turbulent events of the 1960-1965
period here. Suffice it to note that a UN operation from 1960 to 1964 reunified the
country, brokered by 1962 a compromise government under Cyrille Adoula, and forced
Katanga back into the national orbit through military action. The disorder by that time
had subsided, but broke out again in 1964-65 as a wave of rebellion swept a third of the
country. The rebellions fragmented and collapsed by 1965, under attack by national army
units spearheaded by mercenaries with Belgian and American military advisors. This set
the stage for the military power seizure by Mobutu Sese Seko in November 1965.2
Third and Fourth Political Moments: New Provinces and Rebellions
Two distinct political moments in the 1960-1965 period reshaped the ethnic
dimension of Congolese politics. Political and administrative decentralization took place
in 1962, as a response to the crisis, as the six colonial provinces (whose assemblies were
polarized and paralyzed) were divided into twenty-one smaller units. These generally
followed the lines of the former colonial districts, the administrative echelon below the
province. However, the discourse of advocacy of the new provinces resonated with
claims of ethnic self-determination. Partisans of the new units argued that they were
based upon natural affinities, grouping populations that naturally belonged together. But
the affinity claims thus advanced proved less evident in primordial terms than their
2 The “Congo crisis” generated a vast literature. For details and references, see Young 1965 and
Young and Turner 1985.
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partisans believed. Heated boundary disputes arose involving the provincial allocation of
groups such as the Kanyok, the Rega, or the Bobangi, ethnonyms that had never appeared
on the public register in the earlier political moments.
Within the new provinces, the hypothesis of ethnic homogeneity swiftly dissolved
as well, as previously submerged lines of sub-group division surfaced. In the apparently
Luba province of South Kasai, factional struggle revolved around Bena Tshibanda
(downriver) and Bena Mutu wa Mukuna (upriver) groupings. In Sankuru, Eswe (savanna
Tetela) struggled for dominance over an Ekonda (forest Tetela) faction. Here again we
encounter the importance of the multilayered character of identity.
The wave of rebellion challenged social consciousness in a very different way.
The discourse of the rebellions drew upon Third World revolutionary themes,
incorporating themes from Marxism and Maoism. The social enemy was imperialism and
its local agents, the “reactionary” elements who held state office. For government forces,
the rebels and their sympathizers represented demonic forces that had to be exterminated.
When the insurgents captured a town, they often rounded up the white-collar state
employees, as an enemy bourgeoisie, and executed many of them, demonstrating
exemplary vengeance against a social class. In recapturing the same community, the
national army retaliated with executions of real or imagined rebels for a treasonous
uprising against state authority.
These perpetrations of atrocity did not overtly follow ethnic divisions. However,
the traumatizing fears and insecurities that took hold in the vast regions affected by this
warfare inevitably summoned an ethnic map to the mental screen. As insurgent units
approached, local populations anxiously watched for cues as to the ethnic composition of
rebel forces, which might be placed in the cognitive matrix of “friend” or “foe.” When
government forces returned, apprehensions took hold as to whether the army might target
the community for suspected collaboration with the insurgents. Although the social
adventure of the rebellions was not marked by ethnic killings, the extreme insecurity
experienced by many—numerous villagers hid in the forests for months
—
profoundly
imprinted historical memories and became a crucial factor in the quiescence of the
Congolese population in the face of the deepening corruption and oppression of the
Mobutu regime in its last two decades. There was a generalized psychosis of insecurity,
always posing at least subliminal queries as to precisely where and in the company of
what groups safety was assured.
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Intriguing insight into the ethnic dimension of these rebellions is found in the
diaries of the Cuban revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who with a band of 120
Cubans sought to revive a flagging insurgent group on Congo’s eastern frontier from
April to November 1965. Guevara used ethnicity to explain his failure to mobilize
“peasant” solidarity along Marxist-Leninist lines:
The peasants belong to different tribes, of which there are many in the
area. If we look at the enemy army’s report on its general plan of attack,
we notice that it always specifies the tribe to which people belong; this is
an important piece of information for political work. Relations between
the tribes are usually cordial but never truly fraternal, and there is serious
rivalry between some of the tribal groups. This phenomenon may be seen
between the Rwandans [Banyamulenge] and the rest of the Congolese
tribes, but it is also clearly visible between tribes belonging to the North
Katanga ethnic area (who occupied the southern part of our guerrilla
territory) and tribes belonging to the ethnic area of Kivu province (who
occupied the northern part of our territory). (Guevara 2000: 221).
Fifth Political Moment: The Mobutu Regime
The new regime imposed by Mobutu in 1965, lasting more than three decades
until 1997, dramatically altered the rules of the political game. The unitary design of the
colonial state was restored, the twenty-one provinces were recentralized into eight plus
the capital district of Kinshasa, political parties and ethnic associations were banned, and
existing representative assemblies were soon dissolved. A single national party, the
Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), was launched in 1967 and was
represented as “the nation politically organized,” incorporating all Congolese from birth.,
unconstrained by Despite his own complicity in the January 1961 assassination of
Lumumba (along with Belgian and American intelligence services), Mobutu revived the
unitary symbolism of Lumumbist discourse, now described as “authentic Congolese
nationalism” and subsequently as authenticite and Mobutism.
Mobutu’s strategy of asserting nationhood and delegitimating political ethnicity
initially enjoyed wide acceptance. “Tribu oui, tribalisme non” (Tribe yes, tribalism no)
became the mantra of the regime. Ethnicity belonged solely to the private realm; only the
nation had a right to a public presence. The endless political factionalism and
fragmentation of the first half-decade of independence discredited the class of politicians,
as did the evident decline in state effectiveness. Above all, all sections of the Congolese
public shared an immense fatigue with disorder and insecurity. The First Republic, in
popular parlance, had been a disgraceful pagaille (disorderly shambles). The promise of a
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new beginning under a Second Republic, resurrecting the centralized, unitary
authoritarian legacy of the colonial state, joined together with a discourse of African
nationalism, resonated broadly with the citizenry. At an abstract level, everyone is against
“tribalism”—the political use of ethnicity by others—while in personal action everyone
faced the necessity of using identity as a social resource.
The recentralization of state power and the concentration of personal authority in
the presidency fundamentally changed the arena in which ethnicity might operate. The
ethnic factor in national life was now subject to patrimonial management from the
summit. In the ruling organs of the party and government, Mobutu maintained a
calculated ethnic balance; the data on top office-holders in the first decade of his regime
demonstrate a closely proportionate dosage of regional representation (Young and Turner
1985: 151). However, those who enjoyed high office were expected to be merely
symbolic ethnic delegates and not active advocates for their regions. Patrimonial fidelity
assured opportunities for personal enrichment; action as an assertive ethnic ambassador
often provoked speedy exit from office. For an extended period, before the degeneration
of the state undermined Mobutu’s personal ascendancy, the regime posted regional
administrators outside their region of origin.
These measures notwithstanding, ethnicity as political factor in the Congo was
reconfigured rather than erased. Although Mobutu never made public reference to his
own ethnic antecedents, these did not escape public notice and were a constant theme in
the informal banter of bar and workplace. Perceptions of Mobutu’s communal
attachments recognized several layers. In lingua franca terms, Mobutu was a Lingala
speaker, and indeed quietly endeavored to enthrone it as supreme indigenous language. In
regional terms, Mobutu (and the presumed privileged beneficiaries of his rule) was from
Equateur Province. In ethnic categories, Mobutu was an Ngbandi.
The Ngbandi are a group of modest size along the border with the Central African
Republic in the north. This region was relatively isolated in colonial times, lacking
educational infrastructure, and remote from the main migration routes to the major cities.
Thus the Ngbandi group had little visibility, and its ethnonym played no part in the
identity discourse of the late colonial elections. Indeed, when Mobutu first became
politically visible in Kinshasa in the late 1950s, references to him in published sources
attributed several different identities (Ngala, Mongo), but not Ngbandi.
Although regional proportionality was reflected in the top offices, as time went on
an Equateurian inner core to the regime became increasingly evident. This was
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particularly true of the security forces, whose top command was securely in the hands of
leaders whose regional affinity guaranteed their personal loyalty to Mobutu. In the later
Mobutu years, the orbit of reliable loyalty appeared to shrink, and a key Ngbandi inner
circle became evident. As in Uganda, the ethnic security map was crucial to military
politics.
Ethnicity intruded into the informal political realm in other ways. The
authoritarian nature of state operations, as well as its growing everyday ineffectiveness,
made access to government difficult. For the many routine purposes in which some state
action was required—obtaining an identity card, a building permit, a license—an
impersonal visit to a government office was unlikely to meet with immediate success. In
such circumstances, the more productive avenue was to channel the contact through
someone with the same ethnic background, with a social obligation for reciprocal service.
When state decay advanced, the solidarity of cultural affinity became all the more
important as a social resource.
For its first decade, the regime presided over an epoch of stabilization and
economic recovery. The substantial economic and social infrastructure of the colonial
state remained largely intact, and the seeming restoration of an effective government
produced a large flow of external assistance and foreign investment. The extraordinary
venality associated with Mobutu’s patrimonial management of politics only gradually
came to light. The success image of the regime began to fade in the later 1970s, as
corruption, a sharp decline in export earnings, and a swelling external debt undermined
the economy and began to erode the resource base required for Mobutu to continue his
manipulation of the political class. Both state and regime entered a spiral of decline in the
1980s, which accelerated in the early 1990s. By the time a coalition of small rebel groups
took arms against the regime in October 1996, with decisive support from Rwandan,
Ugandan, and Angolan detachments, sweeping across the country to capture Kinshasa in
May 1997, state decay was total and the populace thrown back on their own resources for
survival.
Sixth Political Moment: Demise of Mobutu
The distant origins of the demise of the Mobutu regime reflect gradual changes in
the character of that regime but also exemplify the growing importance of interlocking
cultural identity issues spilling across African borders. We have already encountered
these in the Uganda case. Near the eastern border of Congo, in two locations there were
concentrations of people of both distant and recent Rwandan origin. Some had been
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dissidents who had resisted the expansion of centralized royal power in the kingdom of
Rwandan during the nineteenth century or before, and who had migrated beyond its
reach. Beginning in the 1920s, there was active recruitment of mostly Hutu Rwandan
workers for the emerging European plantation and mining sector in Kivu. Growing
population densities also propelled a voluntary exodus from Rwanda into neighboring
Congo, including both Tutsi herders seeking pasture and Hutu farmers. The episodic
ethnic turmoil in Rwanda beginning in 1959 produced several waves of mostly Tutsi
refugees. Then, following the 1994 genocide, nearly a million Hutu fled to refugee camps
in Kivu.
Belgium had ruled Congo and Ruanda-Urundi as a common unit, and the social
significance of the boundaries was muted in colonial times. But with the separate
independence of Congo and the introduction of democratic elections, the issue of who
might claim Congolese status came onto the agenda. The initial provision was that all
Africans continuously resident in Congo since 1950 enjoyed such rights. But the question
of Rwandan political rights was a heated issue in North Kivu provincial politics in the
early 1960s.
With parties dissolved and competitive elections out of the picture under Mobutu,
the issue subsided. A 1972 ordinance confirmed citizenship status for all Rwandans who
had established residence in the country before independence. In keeping with the
personalist nature of rule at the time, this beneficial measure was not achieved through
collective ethnic action; rather it reflected the individual access to the ruler of a Tutsi of
Rwandan origin, Bisengimana Rema, long-time personal secretary to Mobutu and a
courtier of legendary efficiency.
By the beginning of the 1980s, regime decline meant that Mobutu was more open
to quietly expressed ethnoregional claims. In 1981, at the behest of North Kivu
populations hostile to the Rwandan presence, a new law was adopted radically altering
the criteria for citizenship; proof was now required that one’s ancestors were established
in Congo at the time of its colonial creation in 1885. In 1992, the 2800 delegates to a
national conference assembled to create a new constitutional order reaffirmed the
exclusionary 1981 law, on the insistence of North Kivu representatives.
In Congo, all those of Rwanda origin were referred to as “Banyarwanda,” or
people from Rwanda; no sharp distinction was drawn between Tutsi and Hutu, although
this difference was important within the Rwandan community. The southern pocket
consisted of mostly Tutsi pastoralists in the mountains southeast of Uvira; the northern
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concentration, in the Masisi area, was much larger, perhaps close to a million before the
1994 flood of refugees, was composed of both Tutsi and Hutu. Land rights and control of
local positions were at the heart of the tensions that evolved. Particularly in Masisi, other
local groups passionately believed they held historic claims to the land, and that the
Rwandans were interlopers bent on displacing them from their ancestral rights.
New geographic ethnonyms emerged in the 1980s, distinguishing the two pockets.
The southern group acquired the label of Banyamulenge, named after the mountains in
which they herded; some of them fought alongside Guevara and his Cuban detachment.
The northern group, near Goma, began to be termed Banyamasisi. With the 1994
holocaust in Rwanda, the subsequent power seizure by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), and the Hutu refugee exodus, the Tutsi-Hutu distinction became
clearly drawn among Congolese.
At this point Mobutu had been all but abandoned by his former Western
supporters. Desperately clutching at any expedient to remain in power, he latched onto
the international crisis created by the Hutu refugee situation. Positioning himself as
protector of the Hutu refugees and indispensable intermediary in the regional turbulence,
in the eyes of the new Rwandan regime he became responsible for sheltering the
Interahamwe (Hutu militia involved in the genocide) and former Rwandan army elements
who were launching deadly cross-border raids from the sanctuary of the refugee camps.
The final provocation for Rwanda was an incendiary demand in October 1996 by the
governor of South Kivu that all Banyamulenge, as “foreigners,” had to return
immediately to their ancestral home in Rwanda.
Banyamulenge trained by the Rwandan army then became the fighting core of the
Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo/Zaire (or AFDL, the
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire). A coalition of four
small movements, the AFDL could not have mounted an effective challenge on its own
even to the now-enfeebled Mobutu regime. But Rwanda and Uganda had well-trained
and effective armies to sponsor the AFDL, with Angola entering the fray later. Rwanda in
particular was determined to drive the Hutu refugees and the militia mingled among them
far away from the border.
The demoralized Mobutu army was unable to mount a sustained opposition,
fighting only a few serious skirmishes. The AFDL-Rwandan force quickly put an end to
the Hutu refugee camps, pushing nearly a million refugees back into Rwanda, but more
than 300,000 fled westward deeper into Congo. The great majority perished before
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reaching another border, either from military pursuit, sickness, or starvation. In May
1997, the AFDL marched into Kinshasa, with Rwandan troops a highly visible partner.
Seventh Political Moment: Kabila and His Challengers
The politics of ethnicity in the post-Mobutu shambles thus took on entirely new
dimensions. The lethal escalation of ethnic conflict in neighboring Rwanda (and Burundi)
now became embedded in the heart of Congolese politics. AFDL leader Laurent Kabila
initially was burdened in Congolese eyes by the Tutsi sponsorship. The Rwandan hand
was evident in his emergence as AFDL leader; ironically, his party, the Parti
Revolutionaire du Peuple (PRP, or Revolutionary People’s party), was the only faction
that contributed no fighting men to the alliance. In his first year, the security aspect of the
Kabila regime was under substantial Rwandan influence.
Kabila declared himself president of a virtually defunct state. He had mixed
ethnic antecedents; his father was a Katanga Luba and his mother was a Lunda. But
neither group was prominent in the Kinshasa population. His vehicular language, Swahili,
was much less widely spoken in Kinshasa than Lingala or Kikongo. He had almost never
set foot in the capital, had spent most of his time out of the country since 1965, and had
no potential support networks in the western part of the country. His one trump
card—and that one an ace—was the overwhelming public joy at the overthrow of
Mobutu.
By July 1998, Kabila distanced himself from Rwandan tutelage by expelling the
Rwandan elements from his army command and entourage. Anti-Rwandan Tutsi
sentiment in Kinshasa by this time was intense, so this move won public applause. Then
Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Yerodia
,
in a chilling summons to ethnic hatred, declared
on national radio that Tutsi were “vermin that must be methodically eliminated,” a
statement that led a Belgian magistrate to bring an indictment against him in Brussels in
early 1999 for advocating genocide.
The expulsion of Rwandans by Kabila triggered a further invasion by Rwandan
and Ugandan troops in support of a new insurgent alliance, the Rassemblement Congolais
pour la Democratic (RDC). Kabila appealed to the Southern African Development
Community for military support, and Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia answered the call.
Their swift intervention stymied a lightning strike at Kinshasa by the RDC-Rwanda
alliance, but created a military stalemate. The RDC split into two factions, respectively
backed by Rwanda and Uganda; a third group under Ugandan tutelage emerge in the
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north, the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC). The Burundi army also
entered the fray, in pursuit of Hutu opposition militias operating from Congo.
These developments have left the Congo’s eastern border region in turmoil.
Ethnic militias, which began to emerge in the early 1990s, have grown in number and in
scale. These movements, generally known as Mai Mai, are mainly directed against the
Tutsi; they are armed by Kinshasa and serve as uncertain allies of the Kabila army. Their
principle object is to assert control over areas to which they lay ancestral claim. Rwanda
and Burundi Hutu ethnic militias also operate with government support and occasional
arms. Rwandan and Ugandan detachments provide military cover for the two RDC
factions and the MLC.
Despite the spillover of ethnic conflict in Rwanda, the civil war is by no means
reducible to ethnicity. None of the four major armed factions have a specific ethnic
coloration, and none employ an ethnic vocabulary of solidarity. Their military presence
may be regional, but their ambitions are national.
However, the militarization of local ethnicity along the eastern frontier reflected
in the Mai Mai militias will doubtless have long-term consequences. In the wake of the
pervasive insecurity, other localized conflicts have flared up, such as that between Lendu
and Hema in the Bunia area. Rivalries over land have long existed, but not to the point of
violent confrontation between the communities involved. The Hema, in the popular
catalogue of ethnicity, become framed as an ally by extension of the Tutsi; because
Museveni is a Hima from within the Ankole group (internally divided between Hima
herders and Iru cultivators), a localized dispute is situated in a larger design in the eyes of
a segment of the Congo public. The conspiratorial scheme perceived by many is the
creation of a Tutsi-Hima empire. The UPDF is viewed as naturally partial to the Hema
cause, as a component of this plot.
One paradox emerges as counterpoint to the insecurity in important parts of the
country, and economic devastation everywhere. The country lies in four fragments, each
led by an individual who had been living in exile for many years. It is occupied by six
foreign armies. Yet the one point upon which all seem agreed is that Congo is one
country, and should remain so. The cross-border flow of ethnic tensions from Rwanda
and Burundi, and the internalization of these antagonisms into a mosaic of violence in
much of eastern Congo does not seem to weaken people’s attachment to the idea of one
country, one day to be restored. Nor did the long period when the governing institutions
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of this nation operated in a largely predatory fashion, and ceased providing any valued
services to the citizenry.
Indeed, the conflicts of the seventh political moment appear to reinforce a
national attachment. The animosity to Uganda and especially Rwanda is virtually
universal; they are viewed as illegitimate intruders. A new theme emerges of a natural
“Bantu” solidarity, based on an underlying linguistic and cultural unity originating in an
imagined distant common origin. The proposition that there was a common world view
among “Bantu” populations, reflecting a fundamental cultural commonality, was first
given intellectual formulation by a Flemish missionary, Placide Tempels, in a work first
published in 1944, translated in French in 1945 (Tempels 1945), then reprinted for
international distribution in 1948. Tempels projected his reading of Luba-Katanga
religious belief upon a vast canvas.
The thesis of a natural Bantu cultural unity was given new impetus by a
distinguished Congolese historian, Isidore Ndaywel e Nziem, in his massive history of
Congo (Ndaywel e Nziem 1998). The Nadywel revival of the Bantu unity theme had
instant and potent resonance within the Congolese intelligentsia. Ethnic groups along the
northern frontier, belonging to a different linguistic family, were said to be in process of
Bantuization. The hostile “other” was other linguistic families—Nilotics,
“Hamitics”—associated with hostile neighboring states, and especially Rwandan Tutsi.
The notion that languages identified by linguistic specialists as related betoken ancestral
affinities or meaningful historical identity is dubious; the Bantu thesis is a modem social
construction. But like many other constructed identities, it may well implant itself in the
nested layers of Congolese ethnic consciousness.
In this exploration of the complex ethnic chemistry of Congo as its changing
elements interact over time, and the comparison with Tanzania and Uganda, several
conclusions emerge. The configuration and expression of ethnicity are framed by the
larger structure of politics at any given moment. The sequences of politics play a large
part in determining such configurations; in other words, there is a path dependency to
ethnic politics. Tanzania followed a very different itinerary than Congo, even though they
were both one-party systems for an extended period. Ethnic consciousness exists at
multiple levels; situations and circumstances determine which will shape social choice.
The nature of ethnicity itself can evolve; the categories of consciousness respond to
changing circumstance, as exemplified by the recent separation of Banyarwanda in
eastern Congo into Hutu and Tutsi, the constitution of “Tutsi” as an alien, threatening,
and negative force among many Congolese, and the recent thesis of Congolese Bantu
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unity. An imponderable factor is the impact of sustained ethnic violence upon social
interactions. The extreme insecurity experienced along Congo’s eastern frontier since the
early 1990s and the multiplication of youth militias affects notions of ethnic identity in
ways that bring its primordial dimensions to the fore. Meanwhile, other parts of the
country not affected by armed combat involving insurgent militias or local armed factions
enjoy a relative ethnic peace despite the inability of post-Mobutu rulers to improve their
economic well-being. The curious resiliency of a popular attachment to preservation of
the country keeps alive the possibility of a political settlement within which ethnic
diversity can find accommodation.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The Accommodation of Ethnic Difference
Living with Cultural Pluralism
Of the 189 member states of the United Nations, only a handful are fully
homogeneous. The existence of cultural diversity within a national community is not a
problem to be eliminated by vigorous national integration, but rather a natural condition
of the modem state. The African experience of ethnic diversity within the territorial unit
of sovereignty has a number of special features, but it is a part of a global phenomenon.
Some of the attributes of ethnicity bear the potential for lethal escalation, in given
circumstances. These attributes, which fall within the primordial field of understanding,
relate to the emotional charge which can attach to identity, the fears and anxieties that can
arise when group insecurity is at issue, and the corresponding capacity to demonize a
hostile other. This possibility finds all too many illustrations in the last couple of decades:
Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Rwanda, Burundi. But such an outcome is by no means
inevitable; careful quantitative measurements of the incidence of ethnic warfare around
the globe by Ted Gurr (2000) show that it has declined in the world at large (but not in
Africa). He attributes this decline in part to a process of global political learning in the
last two or three decades, when older illusions about eliminating multiculturalism through
national integration lost their hold. As the world wrestles with its multicultural realities,
the opportunities for sensitized statecraft and accommodative policies become more
apparent. Indeed, most of the time, in most places, everyday interactions among identity
groups are peaceful, and most individuals learn to manage their relationships with ethnic
others in harmonious fashion.
In the African case, the challenge of accommodating ethnicity at the turn of the
millennium takes place within exceptionally difficult circumstances. Since the 1980s,
African states have struggled to find an exit from the economic decline associated with
the failed effort to create command economies and enforce state-dominated development.
In the 1990s, the stunning wave of democratization (though it has clearly ebbed)
nonetheless leaves in its wake an urgent need to find some liberalized form of politics to
replace the utterly discredited single-party autocracies or military dictatorships. The
cumulative effect of economic stagnation and political decay, in the 1990s, was a
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spreading pattern of political disorder, which currently affects a third of the states. The
weakened condition of the African state as an institutional domain makes it more difficult
to mount an effective response to armed challenges by diverse militia. The disorder does
not necessarily reflect ethnic divisions. The four military factions in Congo all resist
ethnic classification. In northern Uganda, although the LRA is predominantly Acholi, the
Acholiland population now fear and detest this rebel militia for the insecurity and
violence that it sows. But an environment of disorder and pervasive insecurity creates
circumstances in which ethnic violence can readily occur.
The possibility for constructive partnerships among culturally diverse citizenries
in Africa is illustrated by the many polities where this has been largely sustained. The
Tanzania chapter provides one such example, but a number of others might have been
chosen to make the same point: Senegal, Mali, Mauritius, Benin, Zambia, among others.
In some respects, although Africa presents along with the former Soviet Union the most
severe challenge to statecraft in defining viable political and market institutions to
compete effectively in a globalizing world, its cultural pluralism might be seen as more
manageable than that in parts of Europe and Asia. Ethnicity in Africa, while belonging to
the same species of identity as its counterparts in other world regions, has some particular
characteristics that may make it more compatible with stable politics than communal
differences elsewhere.
Lack of Ethnonationalism
With few exceptions, ethnicity in Africa is distinct from nationalism. At the core
of the doctrine and ideology of nationalism is a political claim: the right to sovereignty.
As the idea of nationalism took root in Europe in the nineteenth century, it fused with the
doctrine of self-determination. A nation, as a human community with shared history and
common destiny, had a natural entitlement to claim political independence.
Nationalism, in its European origins, took form around existing states with a
dominant cultural personality mirrored in the name of the country, or as a claim to form a
sovereign state on the basis of an ethnolinguistic community. Ethnicity was thus
intimately joined to nationalism. The African itinerary of ethnicity and nationalism,
however, was very different.
The ideology of nationalism was appropriated by anticolonial liberation
movements in Africa, especially after World War II. However, it was formulated (as
Chapter 1 suggested) as a territorial and political concept. The historic struggle for
80 ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN AFRICA
African freedom could not be conducted on an ethnic basis; any effort to do so would
only play into the hands of the colonizer by validating the argument that the innumerable
ethnic divisions made alien rule indispensable. Thus the doctrine of nationalism with its
corollary of a sacred right of self-determination was appropriated and naturalized as a
territorial concept, following the precedent of Western hemisphere nationalisms, with the
crucial difference that its assertion came from indigenous rather than settler populations
(except, initially, in South Africa).
In the vast stretch of Eurasia where most states have a dominant ethnic nation
whose identity names the country, other groups become “national minorities.” African
states, however, do not have “national minorities,” but only a multiplicity of ethnic
communities that stand in at least theoretical equality in their relationships with the
territorial state. In this setting, ethnicity is everywhere but ethnonationalism is rare. The
only exceptions, in the large number of ethnic entities mentioned in this study, are
Buganda and Somalia. The careful reader may have noticed that Ganda identity was
characterized as ethnonationalism; Buganda retains a strong sense of itself as an historic
kingdom equipped with language and culture requiring federal autonomy at a minimum;
twice the kingdom has declared its secession, but has yielded to superior force. Somalia is
a country whose ethnic personality is reflected in the country name, and where the
Somali ethnonationalist claim refers not only to the existing territory but to the ambition
to expand the frontiers to incorporate Somali populations in neighboring states.
But ethnicity as nationalism—that is, joined to the political claim for a separate
state—remains the exception for Africa. Beyond the ethnic examples encountered in this
volume, Ethiopia stands as the only African state to explicitly acknowledge in its
constitution an ethnic right to self-determination, and to redraw its provincial
subdivisions in function of this principle. Ethiopian exceptionalism is partly explained by
the rule from 1974 to 1991 of a regime that adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology and a state
model borrowing Soviet nationality theory.
Thus African states, in contrast to many of their Eurasian counterparts, do not
confront potent ethnonational separatist movements. Buganda is an oddity in the African
context in the ethnic definition of its episodic separatist aspirations. As indicated in the
opening chapter, separatist movements have occurred in Africa and will doubtless emerge
again. Sovereignty claims, however, are almost always advanced on behalf of a formerly
distinct colonial territory (Eritrea, Western Sahara) or an administrative subdivision
thereof (Biafra, Anglophone Cameroon, southern Sudan, Katanga, Casamance).
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Accordingly, Africa escapes the intractable wars of ethnonational self-determination
movements that afflict other areas (Chechnya, Kosovo, Tamils, Aceh).
Ethnicity in Africa also lacks for the most part the hard, chauvinist edge
encountered in zones of intense ethnonational conflict, such as the Balkans or the
Caucasus. The degree to which aggressive ethnic ideologies have taken shape also is less
pronounced. Cultural entrepreneurs have sprung up around some of the more salient
ethnic categories, contributing the historical, literary, and linguistic ligaments of identity
ideology. But only Arabs have the kind of historicized ethnic assertiveness tinged with
chauvinism found, for example, in Serb and Croat school textbooks, which lead to such
oddities as the 1989 Serb ceremonies commemorating the “field of blackbirds” where a
Serb army lost an epic combat with invading Turks in 1389.
An important reason for the more diffuse role of ethnicity in the social landscape
is the predominance of multilingualism. Language, in many settings a core element in the
primordial dimensions of identity, is almost entirely an instrumental issue in Africa. The
existence in a number of countries of lingua franca such as Swahili which serve as a
culturally neutral medium for intergroup communication (without recourse to the
European languages of colonial occupation accessible only to the educated) permits
language policies that do not require linguistic subordination. Acquiring multilingual
skills is an adaptation to a language market separated from connotations of dominance of
“the other.” Each language domain—ancestral, lingua franca, European—has links to
given social settings and requirements. The mother tongue serves as household and local
community medium. The lingua franca operates as link medium in the marketplace and
everyday urban social transactions. The European language services the higher echelons
of the educational system, high politics, and international contacts. Mastering these
linguistic skills asks no identity sacrifices and offers evident advantages. Thus language
politics, so contentious in many multiethnic settings, have been remarkably devoid of
conflict in Africa. With the multilingual pattern now well established, its reproduction
occurs by the natural operation of the social market.
Statecraft and Accommodation of Diversity
Statecraft informed by sensitivity to cultural diversity can achieve positive results.
Leadership makes a huge difference. A careful reading of the Tanzania case of low
intensity ethnicity will surely credit the late President Nyerere with an historic legacy of
fostering harmony. Even though his economic policies fared poorly, his personal integrity
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and selfless commitment to fostering Tanzanian nationhood instilled in the popular
psyche an affective attachment to the territorial polity. By maintaining an entourage of
diverse regional antecedents, and avoiding both the appearance and the reality of reliance
upon an inner ethnic core of key advisors, Nyerere projected a nationalizing image of the
exercise of rule. The only area that experienced significant ethnic and racial tensions was
Zanzibar, where his capacity to shape or influence social interactions was limited by the
islands’ autonomy. Conversely, in Uganda the tyranny of Idi Amin and the shortcomings
of Milton Obote both left in their wake divisive historical memories and regional
antagonisms that could only slowly be effaced.
In the last three decades, governments throughout the globe have become aware
that cultural pluralism does not dissolve through processes of modernization nor yield to
forceful assimilationist projects. The world of nations has become a laboratory for the
accommodation of cultural pluralism. The political learning that has taken place is one
plausible explanation for the declining number of violent ethnic conflicts in the world at
large in the last decade. Africa has been an avid pupil.
The surge of democratization that swept the continent a decade ago, however
incomplete, did compel a review of constitutional arrangements in most countries. This in
turn impelled an explicit confrontation of the ethnic question: how could a liberalized
political order, necessarily including some degree of electoral competition, be framed in
ways that averted the dynamic of escalating ethnic polarization described in the opening
chapter? There were several responses to this dilemma of finding an electoral system that
minimized the likelihood of polarization.
Managing Electoral Competition
One widely employed device, mentioned in the Tanzania chapter, was to
proscribe political parties that were explicitly based upon ethnicity, religion, or race.
Such a requirement exists, for example, in countries such as Nigeria or Eritrea. However,
as the Rwanda and Burundi cases demonstrate, parties that are not ethnic in their formal
designations may become so through the dialectic of competition.
Another mechanism is a requirement that, for presidential contests, the winner
must not only secure an overall majority, but also demonstrate support distributed
through the country. Kenya and Nigeria have experimented with such a policy, in which a
winning candidate must have a stipulated fraction of the vote in a majority of the
provinces as well as a national plurality. In Uganda, a particularly intriguing design was
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proposed for parliamentary elections that were aborted by the 1971 Amin coup. The
country was divided into four zones; candidates were required to compete not only in
their home area, but in constituencies assigned in each of the three other zones. In this
way, they would have been compelled to appeal for votes not simply as ethnic
ambassadors to the legislature, but also as representatives of other interests. We will
never know whether this scheme would have served its integrative purposes, or supplied
new incentives for sectarian campaigning.
A large menu of electoral systems is available for translating citizen votes into
legislative representation (see Reilly and Reynolds 1999, de Silva 1998). The two major
alternatives are single-member district majoritarian systems and proportional
representation; however, there are a number of variations on each of these types, and
combinations of them. The global sweep of democratization in the two decades following
the demise of dictatorship in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the mid-1970s coincided
with a heightened sensitivity to multicultural realities; thus experimentation (and political
learning) with electoral formulas took place with a new awareness of ethnic
accommodation as prime objective. In Africa, the independence constitutions were
faithful replicas of the institutional arrangements of the colonizer. In the 1990s, however,
constitutional debate gave careful attention to electoral arrangements conducive to ethnic
comity.
On the whole, the African trend is towards greater reliance on variants of
proportional representation. Particularly visible and influential was the South African
option in its 1995 constitution for proportional representation calculated on a national
basis. In both national elections conducted under its provisions, this has provided for a
reasonable reflection of racial and ethnic difference as well as party affiliation, which has
helped legitimate the institutional frame of post-apartheid governance. In Senegal, a
mixed system is employed; at the present time, 55 seats are allocated by proportional
representation, with 65 reserved for single member districts. This type of system, also
used in Germany and Russia, has the advantage of retaining a direct constituency link
between some members and a home community, a link that is lost in a proportional
representation system with national lists established solely by the political parties.
An important debate has pitted advocates of an electoral system structured to
create incentives for candidates to appeal beyond their ethnic clientele, against
proponents of voting arrangements aimed at mirroring the ethnic proportions in the
national representative institutions. Donald Horowitz, the leading advocate of the former
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strategy, argues that incentives for interethnic electoral cooperation will avoid campaigns
that inflame communal sentiments and thereby create a more conducive environment for
collaboration in subsequent governance (Horowitz 1991). He proposes the alternative
vote system, by which voters in single-member districts rank candidates; thus contestants
in an ethnically polarized setting are induced to seek second or third place ballots from
voters outside their own ethnic constituency. The argument has theoretical appeal, but the
alternative vote system has been too infrequently used to be certain of its consequences
(mainly in Australia and at times in Papua New Guinea and Fiji).
Arend Lijphart, an influential partisan of proportional representation, links his
preference for this system to a larger theory of consociational democracy for divided
countries. Ethnic proportionality, he argues, leads to a government of cultural coalition,
wherein electorally legitimated delegates of the communal segments can use summit
diplomacy to find equitable resolutions to public policy challenges (see Lijphart 1977).
Consociational theory in its African application is open to the criticism that it relies too
greatly on the premise that ethnic representatives will wish to form national coalitions
rather than narrower ethnic combines to muscle through policies advantageous to one
segment of the nation. It also fails to capture the complex, fluid, multi-layered nature of
African ethnicity stressed in the opening chapter. However, the ethos of an imperative of
ethnic inclusiveness in governance, and the importance of distributive equities in the
legitimation of rule, have enduring value.
On close inspection, many African elections in the democratization decade of the
1990s took place without the inflammation of ethnicity or voting patterns determined by
communal solidarities. To cite two critical elections in 2000, in Senegal and Ghana rulers
who had held power for two decades were ousted by opposition parties, with little
discemable ethnic bloc voting in either case. Of the numerous competitive elections
across the continent in the past decade, only three countries experienced catastrophic
ethnic polarization partly attributable to the tensions bom of communally defined party
competition:
• Congo-Brazzaville in 1993 and again in 1997, when parliamentary elections
were followed by savage combat in the capital between ethnic militias;
• Burundi in 1993, when electoral triumph by a Hutu-dominated party was
overturned by a military coup by the entirely Tutsi army, provoking in turn
deadly ethnic combat that has yet to end, and
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• Rwanda, where the fears and uncertainties surrounding a possible election and
regime change were exploited by a genocidal Hutu clique that unleashed the
1994 holocaust.
Other Formulas
Decentralization is another institutional mechanism for managing diversity. In its
most robust form, this takes the form of federalism. However, only Nigeria and Ethiopia
have formally federalist institutions in 2000; Uganda and South Africa explicitly rejected
this option in their mid-1990s constitutional debates. In the largest and most diverse
polities, only some form of federalism can give sufficient reassurance to the ethnic,
religious, and regional groups who fear marginalization at the center to enable stable and
peaceful politics. In Sudan’s 45 years of independence, for example, the only peaceful
decade in the south was 1972-1983, when a quasi-federal autonomy was in place. In
Congo-Kinshasa, no imaginable formula for reconciliation of the warring factions could
restore the centralized, unitary state of the Lumumbist vision or Mobutu rule in its early
phases.
Decentralization in practice has proved difficult to fully implement,
notwithstanding its advantages in providing political space for ethnic self-awareness.
Decentralized authority and responsibilities have not been matched by delegated
resources sufficient to meet these obligations. The major sources of state revenue—taxes
on external trade, rents from natural resources such as oil, and external
assistance—accrue to the central institutions, who are reluctant to make sufficient
allocation to regional units of government.
More broadly, while constitutional engineering is of substantial value, it cannot
alone respond to the challenge of accommodating cultural diversity. Formal institutions
matter, but rarely function in the manner that abstract public law or political theory might
suggest. The challenge to statecraft posed by a multicultural citizenry requires a
continuous adaptation to an evolving social reality. The current generation of leaders has
a much more sophisticated grasp if the subtleties, shiftings, and shadings of the ethnic
landscape they encounter than did their 1960 predecessors. Long gone is the earlier
illusion that cultural pluralism was a “problem” that awaited a “solution.” Rather, ethnic
diversity is a permanent condition of changing parameters, which invites constant
sensitivity but continuous and creative responsiveness to reconfigured cultural
circumstance.
86 ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN AFRICA
There is no easy path to the effective accommodation of ethnicity. Nor can this
political purpose be abstracted from the larger imperatives of building a more prosperous
economy and discovering a democratic mode of governance rooted in Africa’s cultural
heritage. But the global process of political learning regarding multicultural politics in the
last couple of decades does provide some basis for cautious optimism. So also do the
achievements of Tanzania, South Africa, Mauritius, or Senegal in sustaining intergroup
harmony. If our image of Africa is drawn from such instances as these, rather than
deformed by the most severe cases of protracted civil disorder, then we may better
appreciate the capacity of statecraft, joined to the social adaptability of African
citizenries, to achieve creative coexistence with difference.
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Suggestions for Further Reading and Resources
Entries are grouped under the following categories:
Websites
Journals
General Reference Books
Comparative and Theoretical Works
Country and Regional Studies
Note: Items marked with an asterisk (*) are important books or resources that will be
particularly usefulfor non-specialist readers.
Websites
African Conflict
http://www.afficanconflict.org
Excellent UCLA site specializing in conflict situations, covers current events and
reference information; useful links provided.
African Newspapers
* http://allafrica.com
Entries for all African states, with access to major newspapers.
African Studies Programs
http://www.sas.uperm.edu/Affican_Studies/About_Affican/ww_afstd.html
Contains two dozen links to African Studies Programs and Centers at national and inter-
national universities; several have links to other bibliographic resources.
Country-specific Pages for Africa
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/Affican_Studies/Home_Page/Countrv.html
Has page with links for each African country.
Current News
http://africanews.org
Useful for current news in Africa.
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Ethnologue
http://www7.sil.org/ethnologue/
The Ethnologue is a catalogue of more than 6,700 languages spoken in 228 countries.
The Ethnologue Name Index lists over 39,000 language names, dialect names,
and alternate names. These can be retried by country, language name, language
family, or region. Some maps of language usage are included.
Ethno-national Conflicts: Research Sources
http://leav-w~ww-armv.mil/fmso/geo/pubs/ethno.htm
An extensive on-line bibliography of article and book sources on ethnonationalist
conflicts around the world compiled by Dr. Timothy L. Sanz of the Foreign
Military Studies Office of the United States Army training center at Fort
Leavenworth.
Homelands: Secession, Independence, and Nationalist Movements
http://ww-w.waivefront.com/~homelands/
A listing of major websites for separatist movements around the world.
INCORE guide to Internet sources on conflict and ethnicity in Africa
http://www.mcore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/africa.html
This is a guide for Africa in general, with information available on individual countries.
Minorities at Risk Project
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/
One of the best sites available, managed by Ted Gurr at the University of Maryland.
Gives extensive background on hundreds of ethnic and nationalist conflicts
around the world. Organized by region of the world, country, and group. Includes
chronologies of conflicts and bibliographic sources.
Perry-Castenada Library Map Collection
http://www.lib.utexas.edu:80:/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/Map_collection.html
One of the best internet sites for maps of all regions of the world, including ethnic maps.
Site contains extensive linkages with other map-providing sites as well.
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United Nations High Commission for Refugees
*http://www.reliefweb.int
Coverage of major emergency situations, extracted from local and international press and
other sources; includes items for Great Lakes and Sierra Leone.
United Nations Refworld
http://www.unhcr/ch/ref.world/refworld.htm
Includes extensive information on situation of refugees throughout the world, including
refugees from nationalist and ethnic conflicts. Contains current country reports,
legal and policy-related documents, maps, and literature references.
Journals
The following journals cover contemporary Africa and may contain articles or book
reviews relative to ethnicity:
Africa
Africa Today
African Affairs
African Studies Review
Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines
Canadian Journal ofAfrican Studies
Ethnic and Racial Studies
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies
Journal ofModem African Studies
Modem Africa
Politique Africaine
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General Reference Books
*Africa South of the Sahara. Annual since 1971. London: Europa. Entries for all sub-
Saharan states, including brief history, contemporary governmental information,
and basic statistics.
Encyclopedia of Nationalism. 2 vols. 2001. San Diego: Academic Press. Contributions
from many leading scholars in the field; contains a number of African entries,
both thematic and particular countries, groups or leaders.
Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction. Briefer entries than the other Encyclopedia of Nationalism listed
above; limited African coverage.
*Middleton, John, ed. 1997. Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara. New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1997. 4 vols. Massive work with many entries relevant
to ethnicity.
Morrison, Donald George, Robert Cameron Mitchel, and John Naber Paden. 1989. Black
Africa: A Comparative Handbook. 2d ed. New York: Paragon House. Although
now dated, this comprehensive work has extensive data on sub-Saharan African
states, including demographic figures on ethnic groups; also contains information
on earlier elections, and other demographic data.
*Nolan, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, eds. 1999. Elections in
Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Invaluable reference,
with detailed data on election in all African states, and capsule summary of post-
independence history.
Theoretical and Comparative Works
Amselle, Jean-Loup. 1998. Mestizo Logics: Anthropology of Identity in Africa and Else-
where. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Newly translated work by leading
French anthropologist, using social construction theory.
Amselle, Jean-Loup, and Elikia M’Bokolo, eds. 1985. Au coeur de Vethnie: Ethnies,
tribalisme et etat en Afrique. Early use of constructivist approach applied to
several African cases.
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism. London: Verso. Landmark work influential in the emergence of
the constructivist approach; though its focus is nationalism, its logic is applicable
to ethnicity.
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Asiwaju, A.I. 1984. Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa’s International
Boundaries 1884—1984. London: C. Hurst. The many implications of frontiers
dividing ethnic groups.
Barth, Fredrik, ed. 1969. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of
Culture Difference. Boston: Little, Brown. Classic work, memorable for Barth’s
introduction elucidating the central importance of boundaries in defining identity.
Bennett, David, ed. 1998. Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Identity.
London: Routledge. Application of a “cultural studies” perspective to under-
standing multicultural politics; includes South Africa focus.
Biener, Ronald, ed. 1999. Theorizing Nationalism. Albany: State University of New York
Press. Major overview of current debates over nature of nationalism.
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Novel interpretation of nation-
alism, helpful in understanding its African forms.
Braathen, Einar, Morten Boas, and Gjermond Saether, eds. 2000. Ethnicity Kills? The
Politics of War, Peace, and Ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa. Basingstoke:
Macmillan. A closer look at the violent potential of ethnic conflict, in light of the
spread of civil disorder in the 1990s.
Brass, Paul, ed. 1985. Ethnic Groups and the State. Beckenham, Kent: Croon Helm.
Collection edited by leading scholar in comparative ethnic studies; focus on the
state as the arena for ethnic interaction, competition, and conflict.
Buchanan, Allen. 1991. Secession: The Morality ofPolitical Divorcefrom Fort Sumter to
Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder: Westview. Considers secession claims and when
they may be justified from perspective of moral philosophy; includes Katanga.
Buchheit, Lee C. 1978. Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. New Haven:
Yale University Press. Explores the scope and limits of ethnic and other self-
determination claims from international law perspective.
Cahen, Michel. 1994. Ethnicite politique: Pour une lecture realiste de I’identite. Paris:
L’Harmattan. French scholar argues for acknowledgment of ethnicity as legiti-
mate social force, in face of reluctance of much French scholarship to confront the
issue.
Chirot, Daniel, and Martin E.P. Seligman. 2001. Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Conse-
quences, and Possible Solutions. Washington: American Psychological Associa-
tion. Comprehensive review of psychological interpretations of ethnic conflict and
ways in which it can be resolved.
Cohen, Abner, ed. 1974. Urban Ethnicity. London: Tavistock. Explores the special prop-
erties of ethnicity as redefined in large urban centers; examines the emergence of
new forms of urban ethnicity.
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Cohen, Ronald, and John Middleton, eds. 1970. From Tribe to Nation in Africa.
Scranton: Chandler. Early study with leading anthropologists, tending toward
instrumentalist interpretation of ethnicity as product of competition for power and
resources.
*Comell, Stephen, and Douglas Hartmann. 1998. Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities
in a Changing World. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge. Best current overall interpre-
tive framework for comparative understanding of race and ethnicity; prefers a
constructivist perspective but shows role of primordialist and instrumentalist
approaches as well.
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. 1994. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Essays on impact of
ethnicity on the recent wave of democratization.
Enloe, Cynthia. 1973. Ethnic Conflict and Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown
and Co. Early work of synthesis on Third World ethnic politics.
Enloe, Cynthia. 1980. Ethnic Soldiers: State Sovereignty in Divided Societies. Athens:
University of Georgia Press. Penetrating study of interplay of military and ethnic
politics; shows how regimes in polarized societies use an “ethnic security map” in
organizing armed forces.
Erickson, Thomas. 1993. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives.
London: Pluto. Useful synthesis of anthropological literature bearing upon
ethnicity and nationalism.
Esman, Milton J. 1994. Ethnic Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Major compara-
tive contribution by leading specialist; includes South Africa chapter.
Epstein, A.L. 1978. Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity. London: Tavistock.
Argues the need to include a primordialist dimension to understanding ethnicity;
long section on Zambia.
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. 1975. Ethnicity: Theory and Experience.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Early deployment of an instrumentalist
perspective, several influential essays of lasting value.
*Glickman, Harvey, ed. 1995. Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa. Atlanta:
African Studies Association Press. Case studies of ethnic conflict in the era of
democratization in a number of African states.
Grillo, R.D. 1998. Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture and Ethnicity
in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Useful global
comparative interpretation of ethnicity.
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Gurr, Ted R. 2000. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century.
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. New contribution by a scholar
who has tracked ethnic conflicts around the globe for more than three decades;
valuable quantitative data and analysis.
Hannum, Hurst. 1990. Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press. Careful survey of ethnic and other self-determination issues, from interna-
tional law perspective.
Hardin, Russell. 1995. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton: Princeton
University Press. Systematic application of rational choice theory to ethnic
conflict; argues ethnic solidarity permits overcoming “free rider” problem in
group action.
Hastings, Adrian. 1997. The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and
Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Comparative analysis of
ethnicity and nationalism that stresses religious factor; includes consideration of
African cases.
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Foundational collection of essays for constructivist
theory, providing numerous examples of ethnic identities and practices that are
recent developments, contrary to popular belief.
Horowitz, Donald L. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley: University of California
Press. Major new contribution by a leading scholar in ethnicity field, explaining
the potential for violent episodes in ethnic relations; primarily Asian examples,
but some African cases.
*Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of
California Press. Landmark monograph, widely cited; global coverage, stress on
kinship construction of ethnicity and deep rooting of ethnic divisions.
*Isaacs, Harold. 1975. Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. New
York: Harper and Row. Classic statement of a primordialist perspective, arguing
that ethnic identity responds to deep human need for social anchor.
Ismagilova, Rosa. 1984. Ethnic Problems in Tropical Africa: Can They Be Solved?
Moscow: Progress. Reflects an approach consistent with Soviet Marxist-Leninist
doctrine.
Keyes, Charles, ed. 1982. Ethnic Change. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Collection of instrumentalist and early constructivist essays, mostly drawn from
Asia.
Kuper, Leo. 1977. The Pity of It All: Polarization of Racial and Ethnic Relations.
London: Duckworth. Prophetic work, warning of risks in ethnic polarization.
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Kuper, Leo. 1982. Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century. New Haven:
Yale University Press. Prescient work, which foresaw genocidal potential in
Rwanda and Burundi.
Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. New York: Oxford University Press.
Effort to show possible reconciliation of liberal theory with its individual stress
and group basis of multicultural societies.
Laitin, David D. 1992. Language Repertoires and State Construction in Africa.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Original exploration of the importance
of multilingualism in Africa and its implications for ethnic relations; shows how
widespread multilingualism reduces potential for ethnic conflict.
Lake, David, and Donald Rothchild. The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear,
Diffusion, and Escalation. Explores impact of international diffusion of ethnic
conflicts, frequent in Africa.
*Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.
New Haven: Yale University Press. Classic exposition of his theory of consocia-
tionalism as formula for democratic management of cultural diversity; argues for
ethnic power-sharing and proportional representation.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of
Late Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Argues impact of
“native administration” in sustaining rural ethnicity, by “containerizing” the
African subject within an ethnic jurisdiction applying differential “customary”
law and rule.
Martin, Denis-Constant. 1994. Cartes d’identite: Comment dit-on “nous” en politique?
Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Wide-ranging
collection by mostly French scholars, several Africa essays.
Mazrui, Ali A., and Alamin M. Mazrui. 1998. The Power of Babel: Language and
Governance in the African Experience. Oxford: James Currey, 1998. Language
and identity in Africa; stresses value of African languages and argues for their
greater use.
Neuberger, Benyamin. 1986. National Self-Determination in Post-Colonial Africa.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Wrestles with the dilemma of when self-determination
doctrine applies in Africa.
Nnoli, Okwudiba, ed. 1998. Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA. Collective
volume by African scholars, seeking a distinctively African perspective toward
ethnic conflict and its resolution.
Olorunsola, Victor, ed. 1972. The Politics of Cultural Subnationalism in Africa. Garden
City, N.J.: Doubleday. Remains a valuable collection of case studies in ethnic
politics.
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Olzak, Susan, and Joane Nagel, eds. 1986. Competitive Ethnic Relations. Orlando, FL:
Academic Press. Rigorous use of instrumentalist approach in interpreting ethnic-
ity in various comparative settings, stresses the role of competition for power and
resources.
Oomen, T.K. 1997. Citizenship, Nationality, and Ethnicity: Reconciling Competing
Identities. Cambridge: Polity Press. Reviews a set of issues concerning “who
belongs,” of growing importance in Africa as citizenship questions become more
controversial.
Rabushka, Alvin, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1972. Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of
Democratic Instability. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill. Influential work employing
rational choice theory to argue that ethnic cleavage leads to democratic break-
down.
*Rothchild, Donald S. 1997. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Pressures and
Incentives for Cooperation. Washington: Brookings Institution. Thoughtful and
comprehensive review of policy issues posed by ethnicity.
Rothchild, Donald S., and David I. Lake. 1998. The International Spread of Ethnic
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Focus on the international contagion effect of ethnicity.
Rothchild, Donald S., and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds. 1983. State Versus Ethnic Claims:
African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder: Westview. An early study confronting the
issue of how African states might manage ethnic diversity.
Rothschild, Joseph. 1981. Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework. New York:
Columbia University Press. Systematic development in comparative frame of
instrumentalist approach by specialist in central European contemporary history.
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Brilliant exegesis of
the nature and impact of state codification schemes and their simplification of
ethnicity and other domains.
Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts.
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. Competent overview of ethnic
conflict resolution; tends to consociational perspective.
Sisk, Timothy D., and Andrew Reynolds, eds. 1998. Elections and Conflict Management
in Africa. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press. Examines impact of
different electoral systems in regulation of ethnic and other conflict.
Smith, Anthony D. 1998. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent
Theories of Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge. Survey of contempo-
rary debates on nationalism, including those he provoked, by prolific author who
has written widely on nationalism, including its African form.
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Smith, Anthony D., and John Hutchinson, eds. 1994. Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Useful collection of extracts from a wide variety of important
studies of nationalism.
Tully, James. 1996. Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Exploration of how nationalism as state
ideology can cope in a constitutional rule-of-law state with ethnic diversity.
Vail, Leroy, ed. 1989. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press. Outstanding collection of essays employing constructivist
approach to ethnicity in southern Africa, showing how contemporary ethnic units
were reshaped or even created by colonial contact.
Weinstein, Brian. 1983. The Civic Tongue: Political Consequences ofLanguage Choices.
New York: Longman. Comparative analysis of language politics by an Africanist
scholar; examines impact of language standardization projects.
Wilmsen, Edwin, and Patrick McAllister, eds. 1996. The Politics of Difference: Ethnic
Premises in a World of Power. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Employs
power as a master variable in the comparative exploration of multicultural politics
in an era of increasing ethnic assertiveness.
*Young, Crawford. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press. Compares Africa with Asia and Latin America in identity
politics; instrumentalist perspective; chapters on Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria,
Uganda, and Tanzania.
Young, Crawford, ed. 1998. Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry.
Basingstoke: Macmillan. Surveys policy alternatives for accommodating ethnic
diversity.
Young, Crawford, ed. 1999. The Accommodation of Cultural Diversity: Case Studies.
Basingstoke: Macmillan. Number of case studies on the management of ethnic
diversity African cases include Tanzania and Mauritius.
Young, Crawford, ed. 1993. The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at
Bay? Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Early delineation of primordial-
ism, instrumentalism, and constructivism as distinct conceptual approaches.
Zartman, I. William, ed. 1995. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of
Legitimate Authority. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Exploration of the dynamic and
consequences of state collapse.
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Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke, eds. 1999. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda
Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick: Transaction. Balanced essays by
contributors closely informed on the external role in the wake of the genocide.
Beckett, Paul A., and Crawford Young, eds. 1997. Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria.
Rochester: University of Rochester Press. Includes chapters by Nigerian authors
on religion and ethnicity as factors shaping the prolonged search for a formula for
democratic rule.
Bravman, Bill. 1998. Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and Their Transformation in
Taita, Kenya, 1800-1996. Portsmouth: Heinemann. Shows the evolution and
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California Press. Landmark study, first political science monograph to give
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Cohen, David William, and E.S. Atieno Odhiambo. 1992. Burying SM: The Politics of
Knowledge and the Sociology of Power in Africa. Portsmouth: Heinemann.
Insightful postmodern gloss on the ethnic cross-currents created by a dispute over
burial rights in an interethnic marriage between S. M. Otieno’s Kikuyu widow
and his Luo clan.
Collectif “Changer le Cameroun.” 1992. Le Cameroun eclate? Une anthologie commen-
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*Deng, Francis M. 1995. War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Washington:
Brookings Institution. Fundamental study for understanding ethnic, religious, and
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First Republic. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. Shows intertwined class and
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Diamond, Larry, A. Kirk-Greene, and Oyelele Oyediran, eds. 1997. Transition Without
End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida. Boulder: Lynne
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Ferguson, James. 1999. Expectations ofModernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life in
the Zambian Copperbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press. Explores the
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